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Abstract
The strategy adopted for national energy supply is one of the most important policy choice
for the US. Although it has been dismissed in the past decades, nuclear power today has key
assets when facing concerns on energy dependence and global warming. However, reactor
licensing regulations need to be changed to get all the advantages of the most promising
technologies.
After reviewing the well-known drawbacks of the current regulatory system, the ongoing
reforms from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are presented. We argue that full
benefice of modem risk analysis methods could not be obtained unless adopting a more
ambitious and risk-based regulatory framework.
A risk-based licensing framework is then presented, based on previous research from MIT.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) analyses are used to drive the design toward more
safety, and serve as a vehicle for a constructive discussion between designers and the NRC.
Mandatory multilevel safety goals are proposed to ensure that adequate safety and adequate
treatment of uncertainties are provided.
A case-study finally illustrates how this framework would operate. It is based on the Gas-
cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) project developed at MIT. We show how PRA provides guidance
for the design. Especially, PRA work makes designers consider otherwise overlooked
uncertainties and find proper solutions. In a second phase, a simulation of the review by the
regulator is conducted. Few new safety concerns are brought. The discussion shows that the
proposed risk-based framework has been effective. However, it also highlights that
improvements of PRA methodology and clarification over the treatment of key uncertainties
are needed.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael W. Golay
Title: Professor of Nuclear Engineering
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1. Introduction
With 103 operating reactors, nuclear power produces today 20% of US electricity. The last
construction permit for a nuclear power plant was issued in 1973, six years before the
accident of Three Mile Island. Since then, due to public safety concern as well as poor
economical results, no other nuclear power plant has been built in the US. The problem of
nuclear wastes, dramatically underestimated during the early development of nuclear power
plants, has become an increasing concern as polemics rise around the choice of a final
depository.
However, political interest for nuclear energy is increasing. Nuclear power is one option for
reducing carbon emissions. It could be an essential part of a future hydrogen economy. It is
also an option to reduce national energy dependence.
Although nuclear energy currently does not compete economically under current conditions
with the most competitive energy sources (like coal and natural gas), designers claim that
new generations of reactors would allow considerable construction and operation savings. If
regulatory, construction, and operating cost uncertainties are resolved, then nuclear power
could become very competitive. l Its competitiveness would be further increased if the cost of
carbon emissions of all sources would be internalized.
The designers of these new reactors also claim they can achieve much greater safety. For
example, the new AP-1000 2 design of Westinghouse has a calculated core damage
probability of 2*10-7 . These new designs use passive safety features and new technologies to
reach such low values. Such a high reliability could make acceptable the option of a fleet of
numerous nuclear power plants.
However, the current licensing framework, presented in Part 2 (after the introductory Part 1),
is not adequate for developing a safe and economically competitive fleet of nuclear power
plants. Current regulations are deterministic, prescriptive, and would not allow getting full
advantage of new design options.
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A more rationalist regulatory approach, based on quantitative risk measures, would allow
fitting safety requirements to the characteristics of each design. An optimal safety level
could be achieved, that would not impose useless burden to the licensees. The outcome of
the regulatory process would also be easier to predict.
Therefore, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has initiated a resolute move to
include risk measures in licensing safety regulations. However, risk measures would be used
indirectly. They would be used to produce more efficient deterministic regulations, but
would not allow a rational and predictable case by case safety evaluation of each design.
Some inefficiency would thus remain.
We therefore think that it is necessary to investigate the feasibility of a risk-based approach.
Although actual risk analysis capabilities would need to be improved to support such a
framework, we do not see theoretical grounds for dismissing this option. An iterative
framework for risk-based licensing was already presented at MIT.3 Under this system, risk
analysis is driving the design of the new reactors. A discussion is then initiated between
designers and the regulator, using the risk analysis as a vehicle for stating informed beliefs.
We make a proposal in Part 3 of this thesis for a complete risk-based system based on this
framework.
To illustrate the use of this framework, a case study is then presented in Part 4 of this thesis.
This case study is based on the project of a generation IV Gas-cooled Fast Reactor (GFR)
currently under development at MIT. The risk-driven design phase and the discussion phase
with the regulator are both simulated. In Part 5, the main conclusions from the case study to
the applicability of the risk-based framework are presented.
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2. How to regulate safety of nuclear power plants?
2.1. The role of the regulator
2.1.1. The regulatory agency and its mission
The NRC is the federal agency regulating civilian use of nuclear materials.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the agency is required to ensure that "the
utilization and production of special nuclear material... will provide adequate
protection to the health and safety of the public".4
It is also granted the power to: "[E]stablish by rule, regulation, or order, such standards and
instructions to govern the possession and use of special nuclear material, source material,
and byproduct material as the Commission may deem necessary or desirable to promote the
common defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property".5
Thus, the NRC has three regulatory functions: (i) to establish standards and regulations; (ii)
to issue licenses for nuclear facilities and users of nuclear materials; and (iii) to inspect
facilities and users of nuclear materials in order to ensure compliance with the requirements.
6
Nuclear power plants are complex systems. It is impossible to predict deterministically their
behavior. Thus, the main challenge that the regulator has to deal with is the management of
uncertainties. The various safety regulatory frameworks constitute different responses to
these uncertainties. The different types of uncertainties are therefore first presented, before
examining what responses can be introduced.
2.1.2. The different types of uncertainties
Uncertainties can be separated in two broad categories, i.e. aleatory and epistemic
uncertainties. 7
Aleatory uncertainty appears when an event occurs in a random or stochastic manner. Its
occurrence can then be described by a probability value. This type of uncertainty is also
1 4
qualified of being "irreducible", because it will not decrease with further studies. In contrast,
epistemic uncertainty results from to our lack of knowledge and understanding of a
phenomenon, and is therefore also referred to as "state-of-knowledge" uncertainty. It can be
decreased by further studies.
Three kinds of epistemic uncertainties can be separated:8 9
· Parameter uncertainty: It refers to our incomplete knowledge on the values of the
parameters used in a model. For example, a failure rate or an ultimate strength value
may be used in an analysis, although the expert using it is not certain of its true value.
These uncertainties can be characterized by establishing probability distributions on
parameter values.
* Model uncertainty: It refers to the inability of any model (would it be probabilistic
or deterministic) to replicate exactly the physical phenomena considered. l ° Thus
different models can be proposed for the same process, leading to possible different
outcomes. Expert opinions may differ on how the model should be formulated. There
is model uncertainty because there is no one right model choice, and any model could
possibly give bad results.
* Completeness uncertainty: It arises from the fact that it is impossible to foresee
everything. The scope of any model or analysis is always limited by what is known.
It is impossible to know what has been forgotten in the model. Thus it may stems
from a lack of knowledge. It may also come from a deliberate choice, e.g. the analyst
may have deliberately excluded something from its model to simplify it.
Completeness uncertainty can be considered as a kind of model uncertainty, but
because of its importance, it is often considered separately.
All these types of uncertainties are present when analyzing the functioning of a nuclear
power plant. Parameters are used in any deterministic or probabilistic safety analysis, but
their values are usually uncertain. The models used have been chosen among others, or
rest on specific assumptions that are not always respected. Finally, it is impossible to
prove that everything has been foreseen.
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2.2. The classical regulatory scheme
2.2.1. The development of deterministic safety principles
The first legislation governing nuclear safety is the Atomic Energy Act,l l enacted in 1954.
At this time, no attempt was made to quantify any risk, largely because there was no
experience available to do so. It was known that there were important uncertainties, but they
could not be quantified.
Therefore, the original philosophy of nuclear safety regulations in response to the
uncertainties is one of precaution.12 The essential elements of these regulations are: (i)
conservative design and operations, (ii) large safety margins, (iii) use of design basis
accidents (DBAs), and (iv) defense in depth.
Conservative design means that, when they face various hypotheses, designers have to
choose a pessimistic one. Using large safety margins means that the components and the
whole plant have to be designed to operate far from possible failures. It is a response to
parameter and model uncertainty. It is known that deterministic descriptions are not
adequate, but it is believed that the variation coming from stochastic behaviors and epistemic
uncertainties will not overwhelm the margins.
To define the necessary safety features, the regulators first brainstormed on the question
"what can go wrong?". Their goal was to identify all the possible accidents, and then make
sure that the plant would be able to withstand them. This gave rise to the Design Basis
Accidents system. A design-basis accident is:
'"a postulated accident that a nuclear facility must be designed and built to
withstand without loss to the systems, structures, and components necessary
to assure public health and safety".'3
Worst case scenarios are considered and it is assumed that if the plant is able to withstand
them, then it will be able to withstand any less serious one. It is a response to completeness
uncertainty. It is not possible to predict everything, but the system will be designed to
withstand the worst conditions imaginable.
Finally, defense in depth philosophy is used to globally deal with all the uncertainties. It
originated in the 1940's, and has been developed in the first nuclear safety regulations in
16
response to a systematic question: "what if this barrier or safety feature fails? What if I am
wrong?"'14 The response was a design and operational philosophy that called for multiple
layers of protection to prevent and mitigate possible accidents.'5 An example of this
philosophy is given by a 1967 statement 6 submitted to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy by Clifford Beck. He identified three basic lines of defense: (1) prevention of
accident initiators, (2) engineered safety systems to prevent escalating into major accident,
and (3) confining fission products or minimizing their escape.
I)efense in depth has since been formally defined by the NRC as:
"...a design and operational philosophy with regard to nuclear facilities that
calls for multiple layers of protection to prevent and mitigate accidents. It
includes the use of controls, multiple physical barriers to prevent release of
radiation, redundant and diverse key safety functions, and emergency
response measures."'17
This philosophy has guided the imposition of redundant safety features, so that no single
failure, error, or event could lead to a serious accident.
The safety regulatory system is still based on these deterministic and prescriptive rules. They
present important drawbacks that justify their modification.
2.2.2. Drawbacks of deterministic rules
2.2.2.1. Uncontrolled safety
The main drawback of this regulation system, used purely so until the eighties, is that the
level of safety in each nuclear power plant is not effectively known. The safety margins are
set deterministically, without knowing how they relate to the uncertainties on the system
considered. The level of redundancy required is also set arbitrarily, without controlling the
efficiency or the utility of the various redundant levels. Finally, it is believed that if the plant
is designed to withstand serious accidents, then it will be able to withstand less serious ones.
No attempt is made to design adequate response to small accidents.
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Therefore it is believed that safety investments have been highly misallocated, focusing
sometimes on insignificant safety issues (that are often more expensive to combat) and
possibly neglecting the important ones. Enormous discretion is left to the subjective safety
evaluation by NRC experts. The industry has had long-standing problems with this safety
enforcement method, which has often been found too arbitrary. The Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) also considers that this policy is "not safety related, timely, or objective." ' 8
2.2.2.2. Little incentive for innovation
The prescriptive nature of many of the regulations has made it very difficult for designer to
implement innovations. Plants already licensed have to ask for exemptions to implement
innovative features not fitting into prescriptive regulations. This process usually takes years,
even for minor modifications, and there is clearly no assurance that it will be accepted. As a
result, the costs of seeking an exemption are often greater than those of using the traditional
technology.
An even more serious consequence is the very high regulatory uncertainty for the new
reactors (generation IV reactors). Most of them would be impossible to license under current
water reactors based regulatory framework. Should specific regulations be issued to allow
the licensing of their reactors, designers would not know what would be the new prescriptive
requirements. These uncertainties make it difficult for designers to optimize their work, and
they fear that expensive redundant system will be imposed later.
2.3. Attempts to change the regulations
In spite of these drawbacks, the safety record of the actual plants are good. Only one major
accident occurred (Three Miles Island accident). However, safety regulations could be
improved by using risk analysis methods to allocate better safety expenses. The state of the
art in probabilistic risk analysis makes it possible to change regulations. Therefore, the NRC
has initiated a crucial change in its regulations so that risk insights could be used
systematically.
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2.3.1. The usefulness of Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) i is a systematic method to calculate the failure
probability of a system. It is used in situations where the system is so reliable that classical
statistics cannot be used because data for some important events are too scarce. The first step
in a PRA is to logically identify relevant "initiating events" (IEs), i.e. events that could cause
an accident. Then, event trees are drawn to describe the possible sequences of events from
the IE to possible accidents. The failure probability at each step of the event tree is
quantified using fault tree logic. This is a deductive method in which a final outcome is
assumed and the failures leading to it are logically determined. The system causing the
failure is decomposed logically into its subsystems, which are then further decomposed. The
process stops when data are available for the components in each branch of the tree. It is then
possible to go down to up and get the failure probability of the whole tree, integrate it in the
event tree, and finally get the probability of the accident sequence.
The first large-scale application of PRA for nuclear safety was the famous Reactor Safety
Study (WASH-1400) 9 led in 1975 by Rasmussen. It was the first attempt to describe
logically the safety issues that nuclear power plants were facing. According to a
comprehensive review, it was successful "in making the study of reactor safety more
rational... and in delineating procedures through which quantitative estimates of the risk can
be derived for those sequences for which a database exists." 20 It was, however, initially
dismissed because of the inadequate treatment of the uncertainties that it highlighted. It had
PRA is defined as "a systematic method for addressing the risk triplet as it relates to the performance of a
complex system to understand likely outcomes, sensitivities, areas of. importance, system interactions, and areas
of uncertainty. The risk triplet is the set of three questions that the NRC uses to define "risk": (1) What can go
wrong?, (2) How likely is it?, and (3) What are the consequences?. NRC identifies important scenarios from
such an assessment." NRC web-site glossary, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/probabilistic-
risk-analysis.html
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to be reconsidered after the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident four years later in 1979, ii
when it became clear that it could provide essential risk information that was overlooked by
the traditional approach.
Since then, PRA has been increasingly used. Additional PRAs performed in the US and
abroad have allowed making important methodology improvements.
A letter from the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards presents the main
achievements of PRA. 21 Now, the fundamental questions "What can go wrong?", "How
likely is it?", and "What are the consequences?"2 2 can be quantitatively addressed.
Thousands of accidents are considered through PRAs, in contrast to the few represented by
the design-basis accidents system. Although completeness is always an issue, the application
of PRA by diverse practitioners makes it less and less likely that major contributors are not
identified. Quantification of accident sequences is now possible, and risk contributors are
ranked. PRA also allows analyzing facilities as integrated systems and implementing
important safety improvements. Resources can be used for the most safety important
sequences and risk is more effectively managed. Thus, since industrials begun to perform
plant specific PRAs, the number of IEs has decreased substantially (threefold between 1987
and 1995).23
In spite of all these achievements, nuclear safety regulations in the US have used only
marginally risk insights. Current regulations are largely based on deterministic analyses that
do not take into account quantitative risk measures.2 4
2.3.2. The NRC move toward Risk-Informed regulations
Aware of these challenges, the NRC has initiated a move toward the use of PRA in
regulations when it issued a Policy Statement in 1995 on the use of PRA, 25 stating that:
ii One very important finding of WASH-1400 was that small loss of coolant accident and human errors had an
important contribution in the overall risk. TMI accident was caused by a small loss of coolant accident and a
series of human errors.
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"The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to
the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data and in a
manner that complements the NRC's deterministic approach and supports the
NRC's traditional defense-in-depth philosophy".
PRA and associated analyses should be used "to reduce unnecessary
conservatism associated with current regulatory requirements".
PRA has since been used in some particular safety rules. For example, the Maintenance rule
(10 CFR 50.65), which was implemented in 1996, integrates PRA insights to rank
components according to their risk-significance. Regulatory Guide 1.174 26 has provided a
framework for plant-specific decisions based on risk information and initiated by the
licensees.
Currently, the NRC is preparing an important reform of its procedures to move toward risk-
informed regulations, that the agency defined as:2 7
"...an approach to regulatory decision making that uses risk insights as well
as traditional considerations to focus regulatory and licensee attention on
design and operational issues commensurate with their importance to health
and safety."
Although no definitive decision has been taken yet, the current thinking is to use the risk
insights at a high level, only to determine the appropriate deterministic requirements:
"Established quantitative health objectives (QHOs) and related subsidiary
quantitative objectives will be used to guide the development of risk-informed
regulatory requirements. The intent is to develop requirements, which retain
deterministic characteristics, in such a way that compliance will provide
reasonable assurance of meeting the principal goal of protecting public health
and safety. The quantitative objectives provide risk-informed guidance for the
establishment of practical and enforceable regulatory requirements. They do
not represent acceptance criteria and will not generally appear in risk-
informed regulations." 28
This statement emphasizes that the licensees will not have to prove that they meet any
quantitative safety objective. Quantitative risk values would be used to select appropriate
deterministic requirements, but they would not appear in the regulations themselves. Thus,
DBAs and deterministic requirements would still be the center part of licensing regulations.
Risk insights would be used only to select which DBAs would be the most important to
consider.
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QHOs and "subsidiary quantitative objectives" have already been proposed to define
"Quantitative Objectives for Risk-Informing Regulatory Requirements".2 8 They are
reproduced on Table 2-1 and their justification is presented in Part 2.3.3. The underlying strategy is
to:
"1. limit the frequency of accident initiating events (initiators)
2. limit the probability of core damage given accident initiation
3. limit radionuclide releases during core damage accidents
4. limit public health effects due to core damage accidents "2
The distinction of several levels of risk objectives is an application of defense in depth philosophy.
These objectives will constitute a high-level treatment on uncertainties. No compliance with
any quantified uncertainty limit will be required, but they will ensure that globally an
"appropriate" balance has been achieved.
From the design perspective, uncertainties will still be treated by safety margins.28 In some
cases, safety margins will be defined probabilistically, i.e. the probability that the stress
would be higher than the capacity will be calculated. In other cases, the current practice will
be kept and conservative or bounding calculations will be used to demonstrate that the safety
margins are acceptable.
2.3.3. NRC's Quantitative Health Objectives
As part of its move toward risk-informed regulations, the NRC has been trying to define
acceptable levels of risk. QHOs have been defined in the Safety Goal Policy Statement
(1986).29 The approach taken is to compare the additional risk from the nuclear power plants
for the persons leaving near the plant to the risk from all the other accidents and from cancer:
"The risk to an average individual in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant of
prompt fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed
one tenth of one percent (0.1%) of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting
from other accident to which members of the U.S. population are generally
exposed.
The risk to the population in the area of nuclear power plant of cancer
fatalities that might result from nuclear power plant operation should not
___ ___.
exceed one tenth of one percent (0.1%) of the sum of cancer fatality risks
resulting from all other causes."
Considering the accident and the cancer risk in the U.S., these objectives translate in
respectively 5 * 10 7 and 2*10-6 fatalities per year.
These goals should then been compared to the results of a level 3 PRA "' for each plant.
HI-owever, due to the considerable uncertainties involved in performing a level 3 PRA, and
consistently with the defense in depth philosophy, the NRC has developed lower level
objectives: Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF). 10-
4 / Reactor Year (RY) for the CDF and 10-5 / RY for LERF are the guidelines used.30
Based on these considerations, the NRC has proposed Quantitative Health Objectives.3 '
They should be used as risk guidelines for issuing new risk-informed regulations for light-
water reactors (see Table 2-1). It is still not clear whether higher safety would be required or
not for advanced reactors, although NRC's staff currently favors the same standards for all
reactors.32
iii Three levels of PRA are usually distinguished for nuclear power plants. Level 1 PRAs only study the
progression of the accidents until core damage, the level 2 PRAs evaluate the response of the containment to
the core damage, and finally level 3 PRAs evaluate the transport and consequences of radionuclide releases for
each accident sequence.
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(1) Prevention-Mitigation Assessment: Consider the Strategies in Pairs
Prevent Mitigate
Conditional Probability of EarlyCore Damage Frequency Containment Failure **
<10- 4/ year <101
(2) Initiator-Defense Assessment: Consider the Strategies Individually (Preferred)
Limit the Limit the Probability Limit Radionuclide Limit Public Health
Frequency of of Core Damage Releases During Effects Caused By
Accident Initiating Given Accident Core Damage Core Damage














The product across each row gives LERF< 1 0 5/year. Responding systems and procedures are not
designed for rare events. When applying the quantitative objectives of this figure, in general, no
individual initiator sequence should contribute more than 10% of the value listed.
* No quantitative guideline proposed, using LERF as a surrogate.
** This strategy does not imply that risks associated with late containment failure can or will be
ignored. Potential causes of late containment failure and associated mechanisms for radionuclide
removal prior to containment failure will be considered. A quantitative guideline of <0.1 is proposed
for the probability of a late large release given a core damage accident.
Table 2-1: NRC Quantitative Health Objectives and surrogate risk guidelines 33
2.3.4. The limits of Risk-Informed regulations
Although risk-informed regulations would clearly represent an improvement compared to the
current system, the regulations would still be deterministic, and would therefore keep most
of the drawbacks presented previously.
Using risk inferences to define DBAs should reduce the current inefficiencies of DBAs
addressing too rare sequences and potentially forgetting important ones. However, because














have the same efficiency for all the designs. They would also require the formulation of a
design as the basis for the deterministic prescriptions. As the optimal balance between safety
features should a priori change for different designs, the risk-informed framework will
continue to impose non useful requirements. The level of safety obtained in each plant would
not be known either, and important safety discrepancies could be maintained. Finally, the
persistent use of conservative deterministic safety margins will perpetuate undue
conservatism.
But above all, potential plant specific PRA information will not be used optimally. First, it is
not clear whether a plant specific PRA would be required. Risk-informed regulations do not
require plant specific PRAs, although such additional information would improve regulatory
decision-making.34 Neither is it clear whether any quality standard for PRA would be
enforced. PRAs are expensive to conduct, so that in the absence of specific high quality
requirements, plants will have little incentives to conduct high quality PRAs. Possible
valuable insights could be lost. The investments in PRA third party reviews would probably
be low. Finally, with no high quality plant specific PRA, it would be harder to handle
uncertainties properly. It is likely that uncertainties will not be systematically quantified and
integrated in the analysis.
2.4. The risk-based approach
In a risk-based approach, a risk limit is stated explicitly in the regulations. To prove that they
meet the limit, a licensee has to perform a full-scope risk analysis of his plant. This analysis
would be reviewed extensively by the regulator or a third party.
Such a process ensures that all the plant-specific risk information is considered and logically
integrated. The review should grant that the risk analysis has been appropriate.
This approach first requires formulating all the success criteria probabilistically. For any.
system considered, the uncertainty on the stress and on the capacity would both have to be
quantified. Uncertainty distribution of both the stress and the capacity instead of point values
will have to be used as model inputs. This can represent a major challenge. Some work has
already been done on passive systems to quantify probabilistically the success of specified
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safety functions.4 9 55 In several cases, expert judgment will have to be used and
probabilistically expressed. This should be accepted as long as appropriate justification is
brought into the analysis.
The opposition to a risk-based approach has been motivated by current limitations of PRA
methods. The most important limitations identified are: the quantification of human errors,
common cause failures (CCFs), modeling uncertainties and use of engineering judgment,
and the integration of component aging, and safety culture.3
However, these limitations do not seem to be theoretical limitations of PRA. Progress is
made in each of these domains. More realistic models are proposed to deal with human
errors. The NRC Human Reliability Handbook 36 already provides reasonable models for
evaluating human performance during routine activities. Other models are being developed
to use during accident conditions. Concerning CCFs, extended databases have been
developed by the NRC, with data collection from 1980 to 2001,37 which allow a more
accurate estimation of CCF events. New methods are being investigated for handling model
uncertainties.38 Engineering judgment should be stated systematically and integrated in the
PRA uncertainties. Adequate PRA standards and careful peer review should encourage
engineers to make their judgments explicit. Training in probabilistic theory can help experts
to elicit their knowledge.
The development of living PRA (LPRA) techniques iv is very promising. It can allow
integrating the effects of component aging. As inadequate preventive maintenance could
cause an increase in repair maintenance and failure rates measured in the plant, its effects
could be integrated into the LPRA. This could also be an indication for bad safety culture.
Moreover, LRPA will introduce constant safety concerns in the plant and could, thus,
increase the safety culture.39 International experience shows so far that LPRA
implementation has led to more plant-specific data collection. It has also increased




cooperation between plant staff and PRA analysts, so that plant safety will regularly be
reviewed by measuring the actual plant experience against PRA results, input data, models
and assumptions. 40
Finally, a different approach could be taken for different domains of nuclear power plant
safety regulations. It is proposed in this study that a risk-based framework should be taken
for the licensing of new designs. However, this does not preclude adopting deterministic
rules for other domains, in which a purely risk-based system approach, although
conceivable, may be harder to implement. For the plant construction phase, deterministic
rules could be adopted, as long as they are conforming to an underlying risk analysis.
Concerning the actual operation and management of the plant, sole LPRA monitoring may
be insufficient to prevent any kind of management misconduct. Prescriptive rules will
probably be needed.
To conclude, although it is true that the current PRA state-of-the-art does not support risk-
based regulations, there seems to be little argument against the theoretical application of
risk-based regulations. Therefore, in the light of the advantages that a risk-based regulatory
framework would bring, improving PRA methods should be one of the highest NRC
priorities. However, the regulator will also need to investigate how to use quantitatively risk
information for design guidance and approval. This is the purpose of this study to propose a
risk-based regulatory framework and illustrate on a specific case study how it could be used
by the designers and the regulators.
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3. PROPOSED RISK-BASED FRAMEWORK
The principle of risk-based regulations is clear: a risk limit has to be respected. The first step
is thus to define the risk threshold. Once this limit is set, the licensee can optimize his design
to achieve the desirable safety. In a process proposed by MIT,3 a discussion is initiated
between the licensee and the regulator about the appropriateness of the design from early
design stages. This discussion uses the PRA as a vehicle to state informed beliefs. It can
ensure that the views of the designers and of the regulator are in agreement. Before the
license would be granted, an extensive review of the PRA would be performed.
3.1. Setting quantitative goals - an example
3.1.1. A matter of policy
However powerful it may be for safety analysis, PRA is only a tool to apply a given policy.
In any regulatory framework, the use of PRA is conditional on the determination of a set of
quantitative goals by the regulator.
Therefore the next questions are: who should decide on the risk acceptability levels? What
should this level be?
One could argue that this choice should be left to scientific experts. Based on objective
scientific information (such as how much risk people usually accept for what benefit), it
would be possible to set objective safety goals for nuclear power plants operation. However,
a variety of studies clearly show that the approach taken by experts is never value-free.41 ' 42
As pure science does not give any answer, the question of risk acceptability cannot be a
political-neutral determination. It must therefore involve some non-scientific decision-
making and political decision-making.4 3
The statutes of the NRC require that "adequate safety" should be ensured, but no guideline is
given to translate it into quantitative limits. Moreover, the courts have ruled "the level of
adequate protection need not, and almost certainly will not, be the level of 'zero risk"'.4 4
Therefore, the NRC has some room to define a quantitative level of acceptable risk.
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The definition of QHOs by the NRC constitutes a first step in this direction. Our proposal for
safety goals will be based on them, but we will insist on the treatment of uncertainties and
we will choose slightly more stringent safety goals.
3.1.2. Higher goals for advanced reactors
We see four reasons to justify taking more stringent standards for advanced reactors.
First, the risk thresholds would be the center part of licensing application. The designers
would be granted a license if they prove that they respect the thresholds with appropriate
consideration of uncertainties. In contrast, in the risk-informed framework developed by the
NRC, the risk threshold would only be part of the licensing process. Therefore it is justified
that, by making them the only requirement, the risk threshold would be made more stringent.
Second, advanced reactors will include several safety enhancements that should enable them
to reach higher levels of safety at a lower cost.v Thus, requiring higher level of safety would
be a high level application of the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) principle.
Moreover, current PRAs have shown that several of the current reactors would meet a 10-5
/RY CDF threshold, although they were not optimally designed to meet it. Although the
quality of their PRA may be insufficient in a risk-based regulatory framework, it shows that
it is not unreasonable to require higher standards.
Third, the uncertainties related to many of these new technologies will be higher than the one
used for current reactors. It will therefore be part of the defense in depth strategy to require a
higher safety standard.
Finally, the current guideline of 10-4 /RY for the CDF is rather high. Core damage accidents,
even without any release to the environment, are very harmful for the entire nuclear sector.
Public reaction to such events is likely to be irrational and call for the end of nuclear power.
The TMI accident showed us that core damaging accidents should be avoided, if durable
' For example, in their PRA, AP-1000 designers claim to achieve a CDF of 2.4*10-7 and a Large Release
Frequency of 1.95* 108
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public trust toward nuclear power is to be built. Therefore, a very low CDF should be
imposed, independently of public health objectives. It is a goal in itself. With a mean CDF at
10-4 /RY and around 500 nuclear power plants in the world, we would expect 1 core damage
accidents every 20 years, and one in the US every 100 years. There would be even more if
the number of nuclear power plants is to be increased significantly. Considering the
uncertainties, the chances that the frequency of core damage accidents would be higher are
substantial. The need to avoid any core damage accidents in the years after new nuclear
power plants construction justifies the imposition of a lower CDF level.
3.1.3. Proposed safety goals for advanced reactors
The philosophy underlying the proposed safety objectives is illustrated on Figure 3-1. It is
consistent with NRC's current thinking of risk acceptability.8 Current reactors are in the
tolerable region, and have a small chance of being in the unacceptable region, due to the
uncertainties. Future reactors should be in the acceptable region, with small chance of
being in the tolerable region, and practically no chance of being in the unacceptable
region.
To apply such a statement, both a best estimate and an uncertainty limit goals have to be
established. The best estimate value would ensure that the future reactors will stand in this
acceptable region. Additional epistemic uncertainty treatment has to be required to ensure
that there will be only a little chance that the future reactors will be in the tolerable region. It
would thus be a two-part safety requirement.
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Figure 3-1: Risk acceptability for current and advanced reactorsa
Tolerable and acceptable risk levels have to be defined. These levels could be based on the
5*10-7 fatalities per year limit defined by the NRC. For example, the tolerable limit could be
set at 5*10-7 fatalities per year, and the acceptable limit at 5* 10-8 fatalities per year. The best-
estimate part of the safety goal could be expressed with a mean fatality number, and the
uncertainty goal could be a limit on a high percentile, e.g. the 95th percentile (often chosen
because it makes calculations easier).
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Thus a global safety requirement could be stated as:
A purely risk-based approach would require the satisfaction of these goals only. Although
regulations may tend to such an approach in the long run, we think that the current state of
the art for uncertainty analysis and the current safety approach require a more stringent
control of uncertainties. Consequently, we propose to introduce explicitly defense in depth
requirements in the regulations.
3.1.4. Advanced treatment of uncertainties
The defense in depth philosophy has been a convenient and powerful way to treat
uncertainties. We saw nevertheless that, applied without any risk insight, it is believed to
have led to inefficient safety allocations.
There are today two schools of thought on how defense in depth should be applied in a risk
context.'4
The "structuralist" (or "traditionalist") approach on defense-in-depth asserts that it should be
"embodied in the structure of the regulations and in the design of the facilities". Specific
barriers of protection are required in the regulations themselves. The four traditional lines of
defense are introduced Part 2.3.2.
In contrast, in the rationalist approach, defense-in-depth "is the aggregate of provisions made
to compensate for uncertainty and incompleteness in our knowledge of accident initiation
and progression".'4 Thus, given a quantitative goal, rational defense in depth application is
'' These goals are slightly more stringent than the one currently proposed at the NRC (see Part 2.3.3). Some
justifications is presented in Part 3.1.2 for setting more stringent goals for advanced reactors. However, as
explained in Part 3.1.1, setting quantitative goals is primarily a policy matter and it is out of the scope of this
study to enter safety policy questions.
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- A limit for the mean: 5*10-8 fatalities per year,
- And a limit for the 9 5 th confidence level: 5*10-9 fatalities per year.vi
the process through which the designer ensures that the goals have been achieved and all the
analytical uncertainties treated. The purpose of defense in depth is to "to increase the degree
of confidence in the results of the PRA or other analyses supporting the conclusion that
adequate safety has been achieved".14 In the face of important uncertainties, the designer
could choose to add another barrier or to try to decrease the epistemic uncertainties by
performing new tests or simulations. Both possibilities would be an application of the
rationalist approach of defense in depth.
We propose to apply a combination of both approaches. This is consistent with the
recommendations of some members of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards of
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Structuralist defense in depth:
We propose to use here the traditional distinction between CDF and LERF. Again, the risk
values are stated in terms of mean and 9 5th percentiles values. Indeed, uncertainties have to
be explicitly controlled at every level.
a
Just like the previous global safety goals, these values are proposed examples for the purpose
of this study. The CDF and LERF requirements are slightly more stringent than what is
currently proposed.
Setting these intermediate thresholds serves two purposes. The first is related to the
traditional idea of safety allocation between several barriers. The purpose is to avoid reliance
upon one single barrier, because it is feared that this unique barrier, although theoretically
very reliable, might have been badly evaluated or affected by an unforeseen event.
The second reason for setting intermediate goals is that, even if they do not lead to any
fatalities, core damage and radioactive material release are harmful events in themselves.
Any core damage accident could jeopardize public acceptance of civil nuclear power. The
effect of release of radioactive materials would be even worse. Extreme reaction should be
expected, even if there were no fatalities. Therefore it is justified to set intermediate goals for
the CDF and the LERF.
Finally, we propose voluntary guidelines for the review and the design. The purpose of these
guidelines is to avoid reliance upon a single sequence of events. Indeed, should the
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Thus a global safety requirement could be stated as:
The mean CDF shall be under 5*10-5 per reactor year and the 9 5 th confidence
level shall be under 104 per reactor year.
The mean LERF shall be under 5*10 6 per reactor year and the 9 5 th confidence
level shall be under 10-5 per reactor year.
__
probability of this single sequence be slightly under evaluated, then the impact on the risk
would be high. The guideline could be expressed as: no single event sequence should
contribute for more than 5% of the mean risk threshold. Another possibility would be to
state a similar criterion at the initiating event level: the total contribution from the
sequences of one initiating event should not be more than 10% of the mean risk threshold.
vii,viii It should be emphasized that these two limits have been chosen arbitrarily. The precise
number is not crucial, as these limits should not be seen as strict requisite, but rather as
trends to follow to increase the confidence in the safety achieved.
Rationalist defense in depth:
It is harder to guide the application of the rationalist defense in depth concept. Indeed, this
concept lies precisely in the idea that the designer should be able to choose the best way to
increase the safety and decrease the uncertainties. Therefore, there can be no strict
requirement for the application of rationalist defense in depth (except to meet the high level
safety goals).
vii It is important to note that these guidelines are expressed in terms of percentages of the risk threshold, and
not of the risk level actually achieved by the design. The robustness concept here is distinct from the "balanced
design" view that would require that there would be no sequence accounting for more than some percentage of
the risk of the plant. Consider a design with a CDF of 10-6 and with a sequence accounting for 50% of the CDF
(i.e. leading to core damage with a 5*10-7 probability). Then, even if the design is clearly not balanced, it is
very far from the risk threshold and should be considered as robust.
"'ii The NRC is currently requesting that no individual initiator contribute for more that 10% of any of its
surrogate risks thresholds (see Table 2-1). The effect of this request may depend on how initiators are being
defined. We think that the most important level is that of the sequence, because it represents the actual failure
of safety strategies. We did no want to keep the NRC's distinction between anticipated, infrequent and rare, as
such rigid classification can induce an incoherent risk treatment: initiators with a probability of 10-2 would be
frequent initiators, and would be requested to have a CCDF of 104 and a CDF contribution of 104, whereas for
one with a probability of 5* 10-3 the CCDF threshold would be of 10-2, leading to a CDF contribution of 5*10-5.
In this example, there would be a factor 50 between how both initiators would be treated.
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However, the rationalist approach of defense in depth commands that particular attention
should be brought to the treatment of key uncertainties and key assumptions. ix We give an
illustration of how to identify key uncertainties regarding event failure probabilities. Key
uncertainties will arise concerning failure probabilities that can have a high contribution to
the total risk. Therefore it will concern events having a high value of the Risk Increase Ratio
(RIR, also called Risk Achievement Worth [RAW]). As key uncertainties are related to
domains were there is no knowledge consensus, a simple diagram RIR-"State of knowledge"
illustrates the position of key uncertainties (see Figure 3-3).
ix From NRC Regulatory Guide 1.200:9 A key source of uncertainty is one that is related to an issue in which
there is no consensus approach or model (e.g., choice of data source, success criteria, reactor coolant pressure
seal loss-of-coolant accident model, human reliability model) and in which the choice of approach or model is
known to have an effect upon the PRA results in terms of introducing new accident sequences changing the
relative importance of sequences, or affecting the overall CDF or LERF estimates that might have an impact on





Figure 3-3: RIR-"Sate of Knowledge" generic diagram
Here, the abscissa is a subjective representation of the scientific state of knowledge on basic
events. The failure probabilities that could represent key uncertainties are located in the right
upper part of this diagram.
The treatment of key uncertainties and assumptions will have to be done case by case. The
licensee will have to lead careful analyses and present all the evidence for the peer review
and the NRC review. When facing key uncertainties, a general alternative for the designer
will be to increase its knowledge (e.g. by doing additional tests or modeling) or to add
redundancy so that the failure considered would have a smaller effect upon the total risk. In
the case study of Part 4, we present how the design team could identify and deal with some
key uncertainties.
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The defense in depth strategy is summarized on Figure 3-4.
Structuralist
defense in depth
Flexible guidelines for the
design and the review
Figure 3-4: Levels of defense in depth.
3.2. Risk-Driven design
In the absence of prescriptive deterministic requirements to guide the design of new plants,
concerns of safety and economical efficiency will drive the design choices.
A methodology has been proposed 45 to integrate all the relevant parameters before choosing
a specific design option. Safety, economics, and stakeholder relations are evaluated. Such a
methodology applies best when most of the design is already known.
At earlier stages of the design, economical information is not easily obtained, and
stakeholders' positions are not known. In contrast, the safety impact of design options can be
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A methodology to guide the design from the earliest stages has been proposed at MIT.3 It is
reproduced on Figure 3-5. The first proposed design includes only the most basic features to
produce electricity from a specific plant type. This is the "bare-bones" plant. This design is
then deterministically analyzed to identify paths to unacceptable consequences. Then a PRA
is made to identify the main failure modes. The PRA results are compared with safety goals
(e.g. CDF or LERF mean or 9 5 th percentile, depending on the stage of the design). Safety
features are then added to mitigate the main failure modes, until the design meets the safety
objectives.
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tFigure 3-5: Schematic Diagram of the Risk-Driven Generic Design. 3 Several iterations are
typically needed to satisfy the acceptability goals.
This methodology would be used regularly during the design evolution. Depending on the
advancement of the design, the safety goals could be only an individual IE limit, or several
higher levels limits.
Designers will then ask for a review of their design by the NRC.
3.3. The use of PRA as a Bayesian tool: the MIT iterative
framework
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Figure 3-6: Framework for the risk-based discussion process involving the licensee and the
NRC.
On the basis on deterministic analyses, testing, experience with other designs and their own
judgment, designers propose to the NRC a safety analysis of their plant. Depending on the
maturity of the design, the PRA goes directly to the NRC, or / and is reviewed by a third
party. NRC experts then review the analysis. They review extensively the data used, the





information they received from the third party reviewers and from other external parties,
they may have a different view than the one of the designers. This constitutes the "informed
beliefs" of the regulator.
The informed beliefs of the regulator are used as inputs in the PRA. Some data, uncertainty
bounds, or even models may be modified. Some uncertainty may be added on the results of
some models if NRC experts think that the models are not well-justified. The PRA results
must satisfy the risk limits with these new inputs. NRC experts may also think that some
parts of the PRA are inadequate, and ask the designers to change them.
For important disagreements between NRC experts and designers' analysis, discussions will
be opened. NRC experts will present the points of disagreement. The designers will have the
opportunity to bring additional information to defend their position. In case they are not
successful, they will change the design (e.g. adding other safety barriers) or they can decide
to improve relevant models or databases. Their purpose will be to bring new evidence to
modify the informed beliefs of the regulator.
It is proposed that a discussion with the regulator could be led through all the development
stages of the design. Clearly, the details in the PRA required will depend on the maturity of
the concept.46 A proposal is made in Table 3-1. During the initial stages, the safety analysis
would rely primarily on previous quantitative analysis. An NRC expert could lead a rough
preliminary review and would not require a high level of component testing. As the design
becomes more detailed, additional probabilistic analysis and testing will be required.
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Development Goals and Evaluation Tools Relevant Evidence
Stage Acceptance Criteria




Initial detailed High level - Quantitative - Prior quantitative
design quantitative probabilistic, analyses
deterministic
Final detailed Detailed - Detailed - Prior quantitative
design quantitative (design- quantitative - analyses
specific subgoals) probabilistic,
deterministic
N-th of a kind for a Very detailed- Very detailed - Prior quantitative
given plant type quantitative quantitative, analyses, tests, field
probabilistic, experience
deterministic, tests
Table 3-1: Stages of Nuclear Power Plant Concept Development and corresponding review
levels. 46
In order to obtain a final license approval based on their PRA, the scope and the quality of
the analysis will have to be considerably broaden compared to the current practice.
The scope of the final PRA proposed for license approval will have to be broadened to be as
large as the set of power plant systems and include all its performance phenomena. All the
plant states (full-power, low-power, shutdown, refueling...) have to be included in the PRA.
All the uncertainties will be quantified as well as permitted by the PRA state of the art.
Success criteria will have to be stated probabilistically and included in the PRA. Plant
specific data will complement generic data as far as possible. The analysis will be supported
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by data and model calculations, but inevitably some level of expert judgment will have to be
used. Appropriate documentation and justification for model choices and any subjective
assessment will be provided to reviewers.
During the final iterative stages before the license is granted, the PRA must be seen as a
vehicle for stating the informed beliefs of the regulator. It represents a powerful tool to
integrate all of the safety concerns of the regulator. It also offers a basis for a constructive
dialog with the designers, who will have the possibility to choose the best option to change
the informed beliefs of the regulator and meet its requirements.
In Part 4 of this thesis, a case study is presented to illustrate the application of this
methodology. A part of the PRA for a new reactor project is performed. The project studied
is still at an early stage of its design. It illustrates how the design can be guided by risk
insights expressed with the PRA, and how the regulator would review such a preliminary
design proposal, to provide guidance to the designers.
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4. CASE STUDY
4.1. Presentation of the case study
4.1.1. The Gas-cooled Fast Reactor project
The case study is based on the generation-IV Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) which is
currently under development at MIT. This project is lead by Prof. Driscoll, and began in
November 2001. The main characteristics of the design are summarized on Table A-1.
The designers have so far focused on the core and the Shutdown Cooling System (SCS)
designs. The SCS is designed to be used also as an Emergency Core Cooling System
(ECCS), and is therefore sometimes referred as ECCS in other studies. A preliminary
version of the SCS is presented in Figure 4-1.
The work performed on this case study consists in performing one part of the PRA for this
reactor. The PRA is performed using the Saphire computer code.47
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Legend
EM = Electric Motor
CV = Check Valve
B = Blower
HCHX = Heatric Heat Exchanger
WBHX = Water-Boiler Heat
Exchanger
PCIV = Prestressed Cast Iron
Vessel
Not to Scale
Only one of three loops
shown
Figure 4-1: Shutdown Cooling System initially chosen by the design team
The core can be cooled either by active cooling or, if it fails, by natural convection (passive
mode).
Active mode:
In this mode, an electric motor (EM) obtains electricity from offsite or onsite power sources,
and rotates the blower (B). The hot coolant (coming from the core) flows through a check-
valve (CV), that it kept closed during full power operation (to prevent backflow from station
3 to 2) and opens for emergency cooling. Then the coolant flows through the HeatricTM Heat






Some PRA-related work has been performed to-date on the GFR SCS. Delaney 48 performed
a level 1 PRA on Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCAs), which highlighted the importance of
a reliable active SCS. However, in his model, he did not give any credit to the passive
convection mode. Pagani 49 studied the reliability of the passive cooling mode of the SCS
under depressurized conditions (e.g. after a LOCA), and compared it with that of the active
mode. However, he did not evaluate the reliability of the combination of passive and active
convection modes.
Thus the PRA studies have so far focused on LOCA conditions, and none has evaluated the
reliability of a system combining active and passive cooling capabilities.
4.1.2. Loss Of Offsite Power events
This case study is based on the Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) initiating event PRA. LOOP
events are considered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as being important
contributors to the risk of core damage.50 LOOP accidents can be particularly challenging for
the GFR SCS, as offsite power is the preferred alternating current (AC) source for active
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The blower is supposed to be inoperable (failure of the blower or of the power sources).
Passive flow is induced by the temperature difference between the heat source (core) and the
cold source (HCHX, which is located higher than the core).
The design of the SCS is done so that the passive convection can start from a still state. Thus
it does not require any active system to work. However, the CV still needs to open, and its
failure probability will be higher without the active flow from the blower. Therefore, in the
PRA, the failure of the CV to open under passive flow is a different event than the failure to
open under active flow. It is referred as "CP" failure. Thus "SCS-1-CP-OPEN" means that
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the cecK-valve or loop I rails to open under passive low. A nigner allure prooablllty IS
taken for this event.
Common Heat Sink:
The heat-sink function is common to the active and the passive modes. The heat is
transferred from the core coolant to an intermediate CO2 loop through the HeatricTM Heat
Exchanger (HCHX). The flow in the intermediate loop is passive, and the CO2 is
supercritical. A water boiler constitutes the final heat-sink (evaporatively cooled pool of
water).
components of the SCS. The reliability of onsite AC sources has traditionally been a
concern. Thus, PRAs from the era of the Reactor Safety Study 19 to the more recent
NUREG-1150 51 and since have consistently shown that station blackout scenarios (loss of
all AC power sources) are dominant contributors to the core damage risk of nuclear power
plants.
The PRA is here limited to the level .x Thus, the end-states that are considered are either
"Core Damage", or "OK" (meaning that no accident has occurred). The analysis method
taken is a combined Event Tree (ET) / Fault Tree (FT) analysis. ETs are developed to
describe the possible sequences of events after the initiating event occurred, whereas FTs are
drawn to quantify the probability of each top event of the ET.
4.2. LOOP PRA
4.2.1. Event Tree and Fault Tree analysis
After discussions with the design team, the following sequence of events has been identified
for the LOOP accident sequence:
1st. The reactor has to be tripped. The first event in the ET is "Reactor trip". Failure
to trip is conservatively assumed to lead to core damage, but it should be
addressed in the Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) event tree. After
the ATWS analysis is performed, a more realistic model should be adopted.
2nd. The decay heat has to be removed through the SCS. The fluid will flow either via
active or passive convection. The active mode is the default mode and will be
actuated after the scram. As both AC and DC power are needed for this mode, the
next two events after reactor trip are "Onsite AC Power Generation" and
"Onsite DC Power Generation". The next event is the activation of the SCS
itself (e.g. blower, valves...); the event is "SCS active". Then, if it fails, the
passive mode is relied on to remove the heat ("SCS passive").
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x See supra footnote iii
Thus, the sequence of events after a LOOP is then:
1. Reactor Scram
2. AC Onsite Power Generation (traditionally with diesels)
3. DC Onsite Power Generation
4. Shutdown Cooling System operation through coolant active convection
5. Shutdown Cooling System operation through coolant passive convection
The description of the top events can be found in Appendix B.
Two offsite power recovery events are introduced in the ET sequence. The first one is after
one hour, and the second one after 24 hours. Three time intervals are thus defined: from the
initiating event to one hour, from one hour to 24 hours, and finally for the following 200
hours. Subtrees are defined for all intervals and represented in Appendix A. Usual PRA
made in the US use typical mission times of 8, 24, or 72 hours. However, longer durations
have already been chosen (e.g. 8 days for a PRA in France5 2). The choice of a very long
mission time (200 hours) aims at extending the scope of the PRA to very unlikely events.
Moreover, an event of this order of magnitude has already taken place (a 135 hours LOOP
occurred in 199253).
The quantification of the top events is calculated through fault tree (FT) logic, except for
"reactor trip" and for the recovery events, for which the failure probability is assessed
directly. The FTs can be found in Part C.
4.2.2. PRA data
The data used in the base case are presented on Table B-land Table B-2.
These data represent our current best estimates, based on available data. Most of these data
are generic data developed for water reactors, and their application to the GFR is discussed
component by components in Appendix B. The general methodology is to start from these
values and (i) to increase them when the GFR was thought to be more vulnerable, (ii) to take
a larger uncertainty range if the conditions in the GFR are different, or (iii) to apply directly
the generic values for very similar conditions.
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Except for the probabilities of recovery actions, epistemic uncertainties are assessed by using
lognormal distributions. Thus for each basic event, a mean failure rate and an error factor
(EF) are given. EF values are often given in generic databases, and may be increased
according to common PRA practice (the usual EF range gets from 3 to 30, depending
whether the uncertainties are small or very large). For recovery action probabilities, an
exponential distribution is taken, with the standard deviation adjusted to fit historical data.
The Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) model is used for Common Cause Failures (CCFs). When
no CCF factor could be found, the generic CCF factors proposed in AP-1000 PRA were
chosen (=0.1, y=0.5, 6=0.9 for failures to operate or actuate, and P=0.05, y=0.5, 6=0.9 for
failures to continue functioning).
In some cases, the use of generic data developed for water reactors is clearly not optimal.
Although there is some experience worldwide with gas-cooled reactors, it was not possible
to obtain data specific to these reactors. The precedent PRA studies for the GFR had similar
concerns. Other research teams interested in gas reactors reported the same lack of data.54
The sensitivity analysis performed in Part 4.4 gives insights on what would be the effect on
the licensability if much higher failure probabilities were used.
Among the failure probabilities used, the passive convection failure deserves special
attention because it has a critical importance in the licensability and in the design choices
made and because its assessment is controversial.
4.2.3. Passive convection issue
The design of systems relying on passive convection is based on thermal-hydraulic (T-H)
principles, which in most PRAs are not considered to be subject to any kind of failure.
However, because environment and physical conditions may defer from expectations, these
systems may fail to perform their functions. 55 Assessing the reliability of a physical process
involves many uncertainties and requires a substantial amount of expert judgment. 56 T-H
unreliability can be introduced into the fault tree analysis as a single basic event of the form
"failure of physical process to perform its function".57 The challenge is however to quantify
its probability.
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In the GFR, two failure modes are distinguished for the passive convection: the failure to
start (i.e. the failure to reach a proper steady-state), and the failure to run (i.e. to sustain an
appropriate steady-state). The failure to run is then divided into the failure during the first 24
hours, and the failure to run during 200 hours. These failures affect all the loops
simultaneously (thus they are similar to CCF events).
Pagani 49 studied the failure of the passive convection mode for the GFR SCS design.
However, he studied only the steady-state regime, i.e. he did not consider the possibility that
the system would not reach any steady-state. Thus his work gives quantitative information
regarding the "failure of the passive steady-state" and not regarding the "failure of passive
convection to start".
Pagani found that the failure probability of the long term steady state regime was very low
(10-1 ° for the mean xi) under conditions of full coolant system pressure, which is the
condition during a LOOP initiating event. In his analysis, he included a quantification of the
main parameter uncertainties, and propagated it. However, he used only one model (LOCA-
COLA code from MIT 58), which makes it hard to assess all the modeling uncertainties. The
fact that other T-H experts found similar deterministic results using the RELAP code is a
first indication that the uncertainty introduced by the model choice may not be important.
Based upon these considerations, we took a low failure probability with a high EF for the
failure to run 24 hrs (10-8, EF=30) and for the failure to run 200 hrs (10' 7, EF=30).xii
Xi This number comes from a personal conversation with L. Pagani. We do not have the complete uncertainty
ranges for full pressure conditions, as we have for depressurized states. Pagani found that the uncertainty range
was not very large in depressurized conditions (e.g. one order of magnitude between the mean and the 95 h
percentile). Moreover, he found that pressure was the most important parameter, and that he had to deal with
large pressure uncertainties in the depressurized conditions. Under full pressure, the uncertainties on the
pressure are much lower. However,, it still justifies using a large uncertainty range to acknowledge the lack of
full modeling of the full pressure state.
Xii Pagani took a mission time of 72 hrs only. However, the failure rate of the steady state should be higher
during the first hours when there will be more heat to remove. However, there are high uncertainties on the
functioning of any system for such a long duration. Therefore we take a failure probability one order of
magnitude higher for the 200 hrs mission time.
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The failure to start was not studied by Pagani, and until recently no simulation had been
done. The concern is that the fluid may stratify and fail to reach the steady-state flow. This
would be an extreme situation that the T-H experts estimate to be unlikely, but no
quantitative information was available. A simulation was performed recently, and it was
found that, even under low pressure, passive convection would start from an initially
stagnant fluid. However, no uncertainty calculation was performed and this result is
subjected to many modeling approximations and uncertainties. Although this simulation is a
good indicator that under full pressure the passive convection will start unaided, we can only
derive subjective probabilities from this information. We therefore take a failure probability
of 10-2 and an EF of 30.
Finally, the same difficulty in assessing the reliability of passive convection systems
motivated changes in the design of the intermediate and final heat sink. In the initial design,
the intermediate heat-sink removes the heat through supercritical CO2 passive convection.
The failure of intermediate heat-sink loop would cause the failure of the whole SCS loops.
Therefore, any CCF of several of these loops to remove the heat would cause the system to
fail. Designers thought that this configuration was very reliable, but it was difficult to find
enough quantitative information to grant very high reliability values. Uncertainties on gas
passive convection were too great (especially for a supercritical gas).
Therefore the preferred design was changed for the option of Figure 4-2. Water removes the
heat from the HCHX through passive convection. The steam is vented to the atmosphere.
This option was chosen because water passive convection is much better understood than gas
passive convection. Thus higher reliability values can be taken.
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Legend
EM = Electric Motor
CV = Check Valve
B = Blower
HCHX = Heatric Heat Exchanger
PCIV = Prestressed Cast Iron
Vessel
Not to Scale
Only one of three loops
shown
Figure 4-2: Revised SCS design after changing the intermediate heat sink for a water loop
Water heat-sink:
Heat is taken from the HCHX by the flow of water. The water is heated in the HCHX (thus
removing heat from the HCHX). It is brought to boiling, and the steam is vented to the
atmosphere. Constant water input injection has to be provided.
Double piping is used to make sure no water ingress can occur in the PCIV.





The methodology presented in Part 3.2 is applied to the GFR case. The design of the SCS is
already quite mature (Figure 4-1) and is an important focus for the design team. The
designers are also worried about the failure of AC power source. They want to have risk
insights before choosing to investigate innovative systems to generate onsite power. In
contrast, other aspects of the plant have so far not been studied at all and will be dealt with
much later (e.g. reactor trip system and DC power system). For these systems with no input
from the designers, default design options are taken. Thus three batteries are taken and an
historical reference is used to assess the reliability of the reactor trip system (see
Appendix B).
The risk-driven design focuses on the key areas of concern for the designers, where the
insights from the PRA will be the most valuable. The "decay heat removal" and the "AC
power generation" functions are therefore the main focus for the PRA.
Before starting the risk-driven process, the bare-bones plant has to be defined. Its main
features are:
- 2 SCS loops, designed to remove 50% of the decay heat each, each loop being
as described on Figure 4-1,
- Passive flow in the SCS or active flow with one diesel generating AC power
(and capable of generating 100% of emergency the load). Two cases are
examined; one with passive SCS convection, and one without,
- A reliable trip system.
The methodology of Figure 3-5 is then applied. At each design stage, the dominant cut sets
are identified. They indicate which are the components driving the risks. Safety
improvements are then brought to mitigate these risks.
One departure from the initial methodology is that the iteration is terminated not when the
risk thresholds are satisfied, but rather when there is no readily available way to increase the
safety (i.e. given their state of knowledge, the designers cannot propose demonstrated ways
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to increase safety at reasonable costs). There are three reasons for continuing the safety
improvements beyond the stated goals:
- The safety performance for advanced reactors is currently viewed by
designers as competitive. They think it is preferable to achieve comparable or
better safety levels than competitors' designs. Indeed, safety performance is
likely to be an important parameter when investors will choose to support
building one or another design. Meeting the regulatory safety safety should
therefore not be considered as a sufficient goal,
- Presenting a design to the regulator that is just under the regulatory limit is
likely to be hard to get accepted by NRC experts,
- Bringing as many safety improvements as possible will provide a wider range
of screened option for the designers. It will make later choices easier.
4.3.2. Iterative design
In this Part, the bare-bone plant design has two SCS loops that rely on passive convection to
remove decay heat. The case with no passive convection possibility is described in Appendix
D.
The results of the iterative process are presented on Table 4-1. As the reliability of the
passive convection to start was assessed to be low (see Part 4.2.3), it dominates the risk of
the bare-bones plant (case 1). A diesel generator is added to power the active convection
system (case 2). Thus the redundancy of the active and passive modes is created. As diesels
have a limited reliability (see Table B-2 in Appendix B), the risk remains above 10% of the
CDF threshold. Another diesel is added (case 3) and the risk decreases under the 10%
thresholds, for the mean as well as for the 9 5th values. The single failure of a check-valve
(CV) is the main remaining risk contributor. Redundancy is obtained by adding another SCS
loop (a CCF of two CVs is then needed to cause system failure). The sequence {"Passive
start failure" and "diesel start CCF"} dominates (case 4). This is a station blackout sequence
with failure of the passive convection transient. Another diesel could be added to decrease
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the likelihood of a station blackout, but the change would not be very important and this
contributor would still be dominant.Xii
Therefore, after discussing it with the design team, it appeared preferable to propose an
innovative option that would make passive convection more reliable. First, the blowers will
be kept running slowly all the time. The operators will be ensured that they will be working.
Then, a flywheel will be integrated in each blower. In the case of a station blackout
occurring immediately after the LOOP, the blowers would still have some momentum, and
they would be able to initiate the passive flow.
With the standby blower and the flywheel, the design reaches a very high reliability. It can
still be improved by adding another SCS loop (case 6).
Case Core Damage Components limiting
number Description Probabilityskreduction Next step
·Mean 95th %
1 2*50% loops 1.2E-04 4.1 E-04 Passive convection Start Add diesel
2 2*50%, 1 diesel 1.5E-05 4.1 E-05 (Passive Start + diesel Add diesel
failure)
Add a SCS3 2*50%, 2 diesels 3.4E-06 7.5E-06 CV looploop
Add standby4 3*50%, 2 diesels 2.4E-07 7.5E-07 (Passive Start + diesel system for
failure) blower
5 3*50%, 2 diesels, 4.7E-08 1.3E-07 CV CCF Add a SCS
standby blower loop
6 4*50%, 2 diesels, 1.4E-08 4.4E-08 CV CCF
standby blower
Table 4-1: Risk-Driven design - with passive cooling. CV: check-valve; CCF: Common Cause
Failure; 2 or 3*50%: 2 or 3 SCS loops, each capable of removing 50% of the decay heat
iii Using the Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) model, the CCF of 3 components is half of the CCF of 2
components (with a conventional value of 0.5 for the 8 factor).
56
!
4.3.3. Preliminary design choices
The comparison of the risk-driven design with passive convection (Part 4.3.2) or without
(.Appendix D) highlights the safety improvements brought by the passive convection mode.
Licensing the GFR without passive convection appears to be possible, but it would be much
harder to reach high safety levels. Therefore, the risk calculation provides confidence to the
designers in their desire to allow the decay heat removal using passive cooling. However,
passive cooling alone would not provide sufficient safety, and therefore a system for active
convection has to be included. It is then precisely this combination of passive and active
convection that allows reaching very high reliability levels.
Due to diesel CCFs and to reliance on passive convection, the risk does not decrease much if
a third diesel is added. The choice was thus made to take two diesels only. Concerning the
number of SCS loops, there is a clearer benefit in increasing from three to four loops.
However, it was thought that the safety difference may not be worth the additional costs of a
fourth SCS loop. The safety achieved is already very high with three loops. While this may
still be considered, it is the option that has been chosen in the next steps of the risk-driven
design process.
The design chosen by the preliminary risk-driven process is the design of case 5.
4.4. Robustness evaluation
4.4.1. Key uncertainties treatment
A key uncertainty "is one that is related to an issue in which there is no consensus approach
or model" and "in which the choice of approach or model is known to have an impact on the
PRA results".5 9 Thus, an event in the PRA that is a source of a key uncertainty will be
characterized by a low state of knowledge (high ignorance) and it will also have a relatively
high RIR.
Figure 4-3 is used to identify key uncertainties related to the estimations in the basic events
probabilities. The abscissa is a subjective representation of the scientific state of knowledge
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on one event. Thus, the domain of key uncertainties is on the right part of this axis (no
scientific consensus). The ordinate is the RIR. Significant RIR limits have been represented:
- First limit: if the probability of the event is unity, then the risk doubles
(RIR = 2),
- Second limit: if the probability of the event is unity, then the 10% threshold
of the CDF is reached for LOOP events (RIR=210%*5*10-5 / (5*10-8)
4 RIR= 100),
- Third limit: if the probability of the event is unity, then the CDF threshold is
reached (RIR = 5*10-5 / (5*10-8) . RIR = 1000),
- Fourth limit: Core damage happens if the failure of the event is unity
(RIR > 2* 105)
The failure probabilities that could represent key uncertainties are located in the right upper
part of Figure 4-3.
As the design includes systematic redundancy, all the single failure events have a low RIR
compared to the associated CCF event. They also have a low FV importance. Therefore,
only CCF type events are included in Figure 4-3.
There is no event in the upper right corner, but the failure of water flow in the intermediate
heat sink may be a concern and should be considered more carefully (W-Flow event on the
graph, which represent a CCF on the 3 Water Boiler Loops [WBLs] to run or to start). This
CCF is considered to be very unlikely, as water passive convection is well assessed.
However, experience with the exact same configuration is sparse. There could be some
unidentified mode for the failure to start. Some blockage could be created for unknown
reasons. Therefore, the design team adopted the same approach than with passive convection
of the SCS coolant. It decided to add a pump in the WBL, in order to have some redundancy
between an active and a passive mode.xiv
The effect of this decision can be seen on Figure 4-4. The sequence {pump failure + passive
water flow failure} has the same high RIR than previously {passive water flow failure}, but
there is much less knowledge uncertainty about it (pumps are well-known system).
xiv The pump will not have an active seal (thus it will not be an initiator for pump-seal Loss of Coolant
Accidents [LOCAs]). It would have a specific back-up battery to power it in case of station blackout.
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Moreover, the failure probability of the sequence {pump failure + passive water convection
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UFigure 4-3: RIR - "State of knowledge" diagram, illustrating the unacceptable event W-Flow
Figure 4-4: RIR - "State of knowledge" diagram, illustrating the effect upon the event W-Flow
of adding a pump to the water-based cooling loop.
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HCHX: Heatric Heat Exchanger
W-AV: Water available (for Water Boiler Loop)
RxTrip: Trip of the reactor
Pass-24: Passive convection during 24 hrs
Pass-200: Passive convection during 200 hrs
Pass-St: Passive convection start
W-Flow: Passive water flow in Water Boiler Loop
Batt: Batteries
El trans: Electric transmission for AC and DC
El motor: Electric motor
Hum Act: Human Actions
WBHX: Water Boiler Heat Exchanger
The new design with the pump added in each WBL is shown on Figure 4-5. It is now the
preferred design. New risk calculations have been performed for this design (see Table 4-2).
There are very little changes compared to case 5. However, a real design weakness has been
identified and corrected.
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Table 4-2: PRA results for the definitive risk-driven GFR design
The safety level achieved is excellent: it is generally two orders of magnitude below the
regulatory guidelines proposed.
4.4.2. Extended sensitivity analysis
To provide additional insights about the robustness of the design, we perform an extensive
sensitivity analysis. The events that are included in this analysis are the ones that have a high
Fussell-Vesely importance and a high RIR. Other events, for which the state of knowledge is
considered to be low, have been included (see Table B-4, Table B-5 and Appendix B for
more details). Only CCF type events are considered in the sensitivity analysis.
First, we investigate the limit to which a single individual failure probability can be
increased, while still satisfying our guidelines for a robust design. Some results of this
analysis (given that all the other failure probabilities remain unchanged) are summarized in
Table 4-3. Table 4-3 gives the maximum failure probability of any event, so that no single
sequence will be above 5% of the CDF threshold (the other guideline of 10% contribution of
the CDF for LOOP events is then automatically satisfied). This maximum failure probability
is then compared to the failure probability of the same event in the base case (see Table 4-3






















HCHX Run 1 hour 5.00E-08 2.0E-04 4.OE+03
Run 24 hrs 1.2E-06 2.0E-04 1.7E+02
Run 200 hrs 1.OE-05 2.0E-02 2.OE+03
Water Available Run 1 hour 1.OE-08 2.0E-04 2.OE+04
Run 24 hrs 1.OE-07 2.0E-04 2.OE+03
Run 200 hrs 1.OE-06 2.OE-02 2.OE+04
Pump*passive Run 1 hour 2.OE-11 2.0E-04 1.OE+07
water flow Run 24 hrs | 6.0E-13 2.OE-04 3.3E+08
| Run 200 hrs 5.OE-12 2.OE-02 4.OE+09
Passive failure to start*blower standby 1.OE-07 1.OE-01 1.OE+06
failure
Passive Run 24 hrs 1.OE-08 5.OE-02 5.OE+06
convection Run 200 hrs 1.OE-07 5.OE-02 5.OE+05
CP Open I 1.OE-04 1.OE-01 1.OE+03
Run 24 hrs 4.8E-07 5.OE-02 1.OE+05
Run 200 hrs 4.OE-06 5.OE-02 1.3E+04
Probability of Recovery after 24 hrs 1.6E-02 1.OE+00 6.3E+01
Table 4-3: Maximum failure probabilities consistent with the guideline of no single sequence
contributing more than 5% of the risk threshold.
Base case values are those of Table B-2.
A log-scale illustration of these results is shown on Figure 4-6.
xv Important: the numbers in Table 4-3 and Table 4-4 are CCF values, i.e. the independent failure probabilities
multiplied by the CCF beta factors (there are only double CCFs here). For example, for the CV failure to open:



























Figure 4-6: Graphical illustration of the results of Table 4-3
These results show that the GFR design has very high safety margins. Even if we have
underestimated a failure probability, the robustness guidelines would not be exceeded unless
the underestimation was by several orders of magnitude. Actually, all the maximum values
are unrealistically high, so that the design safety is robust to any increase in one failure
probability.
However, this first sensitivity analysis does not take into account the effects of the
simultaneous increase of several failure probabilities. Therefore, to illustrate further the
safety of the GFR, a sensitivity analysis is performed with all the failure probabilities
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increasing at the same time. With the set of values proposed in Table 4-4, the design satisfies
both robustness guidelines (5% maximum for any sequence and 10% for LOOP initiating
event) for the mean and for the 95th percentiles values. A graphical illustration is shown on
Figure 4-7.
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Table 4-4: Maximum allowable failure probabilities for all the
the robustness guidelinesi"
.
events consistent with meeting
XI' See supra note xv
xVii Here both robustness guidelines are met in terms of mean and 95h percentile: there is no sequence that
contributes more than 5% of the CDF (mean and 95" percentile), and the contribution of the LOOP initiating
event is less than 10% of the CDF (mean and 95"t percentile).
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Probability
CCF type xV' Base case Max group failure Max/BC
(BC) probability
Reactor trip 1.OE-07 4.0E-05 4.0E+02
CV Open 2.7E-06 8.OE-05 3.OE+01
Run 24 hrs 2.4E-07 8.OE-05 3.3E+02
Run 200 hrs 2.0OE-06 8.OE-04 4.0E+02
HCHX Run 1 hour 5.OE-08 8.0E-05 1.6E+03
Run 24 hrs 1.2E-06 8.0E-05 6.7E+01
Run 200 hrs 1.OE-05 8.OE-04 8.OE+01
Water Available Run 1 hour 1.OE-08 4.OE-05 4.0E+03
Run 24 hrs 1.OE-07 4.OE-05 4.0E+02
Run 200 hrs 1.OE-06 8.OE-04 8.0E+02
Pump*passive Run 1 hour 2.0E-11 5.OE-05 2.5E+06
water flow Run 24 hrs 6.OE-13 4.0E-05 6.7E+07
Run 200 hrs 5.OE-12 1.OE-03 2.0E+08
Passive failure to start*blower 1.OE-07 4.OE-02 4.0E+05
standby failure
Passive Run 24 hrs 1.OE-08 1.OE-02 1.OE+06
convection Run 200 hrs 1.OE-07 2.0E-02 2.0E+05
CP Open 1.OE-04 4.OE-02 4.0E+02
Run 24 hrs 4.8E-07 2.OE-02 4.2E+04
Run 200 hrs 4.OE-06 4.OE-02 1.OE+04
Probability of Recovery after 24 1.6E-02 1.OE-01
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Figure 4-7: Graphical illustration of the results of Table 4-4
Table 4-5 shows the mean and 95t h percentile for the CDF due to LOOP when all the failure
probabilities take the value of Table 4-4.
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Table 4-5: Safety levels achieved using the maximum allowable failure probability values from
Table 4-4.
(1) 10% of 5*10- 5 = 5*10 -6 (2) 10% of 10-4 = 10-5
(3) 5% of5*10- 5 = 2.5*10 -6 (4) 5% of 10 -4 = 5*10 -6
The values obtained are still unrealistically high. The CCF of the CV to open and the CCF of
the HCHX to operate 24 hours or 200 hours are the events that have the relative lowest
margin. However, as is explained in Appendice B.2, there is no argument for adopting
failure probability values much higher than those used in the base case. Reasons for this are
that the forces to open the CV will be very high, and, according to Heatric experiments, their
heat exchangers have never experienced a leak.
The values obtained during these sensitivity analysis tests do not have a real physical
meaning. The purpose is more to illustrate the margin of safety achieved by the GFR. While
such high margin results should not be required by the regulator, this constitutes a powerful
response to the concern that several failure rates used for critical events were either generic
or highly subjective.
These results should be used in the discussion with the regulator. For example, if a NRC
expert disagrees with the failure probability used for the CV, then he should express the
value that should be taken according to his experience and the evidence provided. If this
value is lower than the one found in the sensitivity analysis (from Table 4-3 or Table 4-4
depending whether only one probability has been changed or several), then this should not
be a sufficient argument against the licensability of the GFR.
l r
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These last sensitivity results did not change the design that had been chosen. More
sensitivity analysis could be performed, but there would probably not lead to further
changes. Therefore, the design is thought to be ready for the second phase of the simulation,
i.e. the presentation to the regulator. This final design is that of case 5 of Table 4-1, with the
pump added in the WBL (see Figure 4-5).
4.5. Discussion with the regulator
A mock licensing simulation was made at MIT to illustrate the discussion that would be
initiated between the designer and the regulator, according to the discussion framework
presented on Figure 3-6. The goal of this discussion is to check that the direction and the
options chosen for the design are acceptable from a regulatory perspective.
Prof. G. Apostolakis xvii and PRA graduate student Craig Matos took the role of NRC
experts. A meeting was organized, where the safety analysis and results were presented.
Prof. M. Driscoll was representing the design team. Previous documentation on the PRA had
been distributed, and Craig Matos had reviewed it.
Although the time dedicated to this review by our NRC experts was limited, interesting
questions were raised on the GFR design and on the PRA.
Concerning the design, worries were expressed about the reliability of the ultimate heat sink
in the SCS. In the design of Figure 4-5, steam is directly vented to the atmosphere. Should
there be a leak in the HCHX, a direct flow path between the core and the environment would
be created, and some radioactivity could then be released. This concern did not appear in the
LOOP PRA, although it would probably have appeared in other parts of a complete PRA.
Xii Prof. George E. Apostolakis is Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the MIT. Among other activities, he is a
member of the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (and he was the chairman in 2001-2002). He
was therefore well qualified to endorse the role of a NRC reviewer.
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Satisfying options were presented by the design team to solve this problem (e.g. venting the
water inside the containment, or changing the opened loop to a closed water loop).
Concerning the PRA, the reviewers had some concerns about the use of generic data for
critical components, especially for the CV. Although it was shown by the PRA that there
were very high safety margins relative to the failure probability value used, reviewers
insisted that extensive testing will be required. Because of the high reliability that CVs must
reach, it was feared that it may be impossible (or much too expensive) to do enough testing.
Therefore it is likely that eventually an additional active actuator will be required.
Some reservations were also expressed concerning the PRA model. More work should be
done to integrate explicitly success criteria into the PRA. This would require extensive
probabilistic treatment of model uncertainties, which has not been performed yet. The
current PRA state of the art should be improved in order to deal adequately with these
concerns. The regulator should also be given a more extensive access to the deterministic
and probabilistic models and calculations used for the success criteria.
Although it was rather out of the scope of the limited LOOP safety analysis exposed,
reviewers expressed the necessity to create a specific framework outside the PRA in order to
treat the issue of adequate management.
There were no other critic on the work performed by the design and the safety analysis
teams. The reviewers were satisfied with the rest of the analysis. Especially, they thought
that the treatment of epistemic uncertainties of passive convection had been adequate. In
spite of the few critics, they thought that the GFR was so far in very good shape for future
licensing purposes.
For the design team, this review has brought valuable insights. It first confirms that most of
the safety issues are being treated adequately. The reservations expressed will not change the
design fundamentally, but will help in improving it in a direction more acceptable to the
regulator.
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5. Discussion of the risk-based framework
5.1. Insights for the MIT iterative framework
No fundamental flaw was found during the licensing simulation using the MIT iterative
framework.
The design risk-driven process was very effective in bringing new safety concerns to the
designers and allowed them to ranks safety options. One key element in this process was the
establishment of a continuing discussion between designers and safety analysts. Especially at
early design stages, when data available are generic and more subjectivity has to be
introduced, it is essential to discuss PRA results in order to avoid any misinterpretations. For
example, in some early analyses, it was assumed that the intermediate heat-sink CO2 passive
loop would be perfect. This assumption was made because there was no data available for
assessing its reliability and first discussions with some designers indicated that it would not
be an issue. Explicating clearly the PRA assumptions and limitations had the effect of
broadening the discussion with the designers. Therefore it is especially important to discuss
the results of a PRA, and not merely provide raw numbers to the designers.
The simulation highlighted differences of appreciation about key uncertainties between the
safety analyst and the NRC experts. The failure probability of the CV was considered by
reviewers as a key uncertainty, and they required either improvements in the relevant
knowledge or added redundancy. In the safety analysis, generic values were used for the CV
failure probability, as at this stage of the design there was no reason to think it would be less
reliable in the GFR. The sensitivity analysis had also demonstrated that good safety results
would be obtained even with a failure probability much higher than the generic one.
However, these last arguments were dismissed by the NRC experts, who refused to elicit
their informed beliefs, and it was required to decrease epistemic uncertainty or change the
design.
This example illustrates the issue of the identification and treatment of key uncertainties.
Should there be a systematic and replicable definition of key uncertainties, defining up to
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what limit are uncertainties acceptable? Could the RIR-"State-Of-Knowledge" diagram (see
Figure 3-3) be used for this purpose, provided that an objective quantification of the "state of
knowledge" is made? Once key uncertainties have been identified, should it be required to
decrease their RIR or their epistemic uncertainty regardless of the implications on the total
risk?
Clear guidelines concerning the identification and treatment of key uncertainties would
allow better prediction of the reaction of the regulator. Thus the difference of interpretation
of the CV failure data would have been avoided.
Finally, the sensitivity analysis performed in Part 4.4.2 was not as useful as expected during
the review process. While this may be due to the lack of time available to the reviewers, it is
also linked to the previous comment. Indeed, the sensitivity analysis was performed so that
the reviewers could compare their informed belief with the maximum values presented in the
sensitivity analysis. As reviewers were reluctant to elicit their belief, these values were not
effectively useful.
5.2. Dealing with Information asymmetries
One important aspect of the risk-based simulation is the management of information. There
is a clear information asymmetry in the sense that the designer has much more information
on its plant than the regulator and than the eventual buyer. One concern is that, if the
designer does not disclose all the relevant information, then the assessment of the regulator
would be distorted. In response to this asymmetry, the regulator may choose to err more on
the side of conservatism. This could create a vicious circle: in response to undue
conservatism, the designer may be tempted to hide more information...XiX
XiX The issue of the regulator obtaining appropriate information is more subtle than just the possibility of the
designer hiding some unfavorable data. It can take more insidious forms: for example the designers will have
an incentive to do a very careful analysis of the main risk contributors in order to find arguments for decreasing
their frequency and for ensuring they have not been overestimated. In contrast there is no incentive for the
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A specific domain in which information asymmetries could be found is in the use of generic
data values.60 Indeed a designer would have an incentive to depart from generic values only
if he were to think that the safety performance of the plant would be better than the generic
data.' x The use of default values should therefore be seen by the regulator as "red flags"
requiring more careful review.
Therefore a prerequisite for the proper functioning of a risk-based regulatory system is a
mutual trust between the designer and the regulator. They must both work in cooperation.
Our case study is an example of such a situation, as there was clearly no incentive for the
student performing the safety analysis to hide the limitations of the analysis. Thus, they were
clearly exposed. However, such a situation is not natural. Designers have natural incentives
not to disclose unfavorable information, or at least to emphasize evidence for good safety
performances.
Some incentive should therefore be given for the designer to work in real partnership with
the regulator.
We think that the discussion framework presented in this study can help achieving this
purpose. During early design stages, there are fewer incentives for the designer to try to hide
important problems. Its goal is to improve the design and get the feedback of the regulator
on important issues. It is thus an opportunity for a real dialog and cooperation with the
regulator. The reviews by the NRC and by third parties will try to highlight the areas where
the evidence presented is insufficient. If the review is careful enough, there will be few
possibilities for not presenting all of the needed information.
designer to ensure that other frequencies less reviewed have not been underestimated. It would be the purpose
of the reviews to ensure that it has not been the case, but the active cooperation of the designer would make the
process go faster and be more efficiently.
XX A way to counter this incentive would be to set more conservative generic values. This would provide
incentives to perform and disclose more plant specific testing, to justify taking more reliable values than the
generic ones. But using conservative values would compromise the goal of PRA, which is to give the most
accurate possible quantification of the risk.
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Finally, there should be clear financial incentives for the designer to disclose information
and to perform needed testing. Heavy penalties should be imposed if after the fact "bad
faith" of the designer has been proven. A mandatory strict living PRA program may also be
an incentive for the designer to present the best safety analysis possible, as the results of the
living PRA could demonstrate whether the design safety analysis had been performed
adequately. The regulator could also make the designer pay a high price for the review
process: the designer would therefore have an incentive to make it go as fast as possible, and
would propose a design with more evidence to support its assumptions.
Thus, there are ways to increase the trust between the regulator and the licensee. Other
possibilities should be investigated. However, even if perfect cooperation between the
licensee and the regulator may be impossible to achieve, this should not be seen as an
argument against using risk-based regulations. This problem exists with deterministic
regulations as well, and is currently addressed through formally unjustified decisions from
the regulator. The risk-based dialog offers opportunities to create a real dialog and to
increase the trust between the regulator and the licensee.
5.3. Licenses for generation IV reactors
The safety analysis of the GFR has highlighted the difficulties of obtaining good data for
innovative generation IV reactors. Although it may be possible to obtain some data from
existing gas reactors, the applicability to new designs will always be problematic. It will
involve important subjectivity, and the regulator should be careful when reviewing how the
designers accounted for these epistemic uncertainties. It may be useful to develop guidelines
on this subject.
In the case study presented here, engineering analysis are used to justify the use of generic
values. For example, concerning the failure of the CV to open, the forces to open it are




However, it is likely that knowledge uncertainties about new reactors will have to be handled
by adding redundancy. This was the approach taken for concerns about passive convections
reliability. While more extensive probabilistic safety analyses of passive systems are
performed in other research projects,56 the option chosen here was to include active
convection capabilities. This approach is comparable to that chosen at the beginning of the
civil nuclear era, when precaution imposed several barriers. However, in a risk-based
approach, epistemic uncertainties and the effect of redundancy are quantified. Moreover, the
designer can choose the most efficient option between the alternatives of decreasing the
epistemic uncertainty and changing the design.
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6. Conclusion
Starting from the statement that current licensing regulations are not well-adapted to an
efficient development of the nuclear power plants fleet, a risk-based regulatory framework is
proposed. It is based on previous work at MIT.3 PRA is used as an instrument to create a
dialog between the regulator and the designers and serves as a vehicle to state the informed
beliefs of each party. This framework is preferred to the current NRC efforts to risk-inform
regulations because it is considered that it would lead to more efficient decisions. We believe
that PRA methodology improvements will be able in the medium run to support risk-based
regulations.
Possible quantitative safety goals have been proposed as base of the risk-based discussion.
Compliance with a high level safety goal ensures that adequate safety is being provided,
while satisfaction of lower levels safety goals ensures appropriate management of
uncertainties. A treatment of key uncertainties based on the Risk Increase Ratio measure is
proposed.
A case study has been conducted to test this methodology. It is based on a project for a
generation IV reactor. The safety analysis focuses on Loss Of Offsite Power events.
A first part of the case study illustrates how the design can be driven by PRA results.
Discussions between PRA experts and the design team of the PRA results and of the PRA
inputs highlighted new safety concerns and led to innovative design solutions. The process
was successful in achieving a very high level of safety. Diverse importance calculations
demonstrated the robustness of the design.
During the second part of the case study, the review by the regulator was simulated. A
discussion took place between mock NRC experts, the safety analyst, and the designers. A
few safety concerns were discussed, but the NRC experts globally agreed on the high quality
of the design.
76
This review highlighted the need for systematic probabilistic analysis of success criteria that
should be included in the PRA, and presented to the regulator for review. The difficulty of
identifying and treating key uncertainties in a predictable way was apparent.
However, the case study did not reveal any serious flaw in the iterative risk-based
methodology used. As it would be a very powerful tool to promote the development of
nuclear power plants, more research should be done to improve PRA methodology.
Many areas of PRA would need improvements in order to support risk-based regulations.
The probabilistic treatment of success criteria and modeling uncertainties should first be
generalized. Technical experts should be trained to elicit their judgments so that they could
be explicitly integrated into the analysis. A framework for the inclusion of plant
construction, operations and management regulations should be designed.
Peer and regulatory PRA review capacities would have to be increased. This would be the
best assurance against needlessly large completeness uncertainties.
The NRC should lead part of the research effort to improve PRAs. Indeed, this research
would benefit to the entire nuclear industry. The existence of these positive externalities
would lead to underinvestment if the private sector does all the research. A strong
commitment of the NRC is also needed to set the path for industrials and build trust that
PRA use will increase in future regulations.
77
7. References
'Deutch, J., Moniz, E. J., Ansolabehere, S., Driscoll, M., Gray, P. E., Holdren, J. P., Joskow, P. L., Lester, R.
K., and Todreas, N. E. 'The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study". Cambridge, MA,
MIT, 2003
2 Westinghouse Electric Company, "AP-1000 Probability Risk Assessment, Revision 1," Pittsburgh, PA, 2003
3 Beer, B., Golay, M. W. and.Apostolakis, G.E., "Feasability Investigations for Risk-Based Nuclear Safety
Regulation", MIT-NSP-TR003, February, 2000
4 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a).
42 U.S.C. § 2201(b).
6 USNRC, "NRC - Regulator of Nuclear Safety", NUREG/BR-0164, Revision 4, Washington, D.C.
7 Apostolakis, G.E., "The Concept Of Probability In Safety Assessment Of Technological Systems", Science,
250,1359-1364, 1990
8 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, "Regulatory Structure For
New Plant Licensing, Part 1: Technology-Neutral Framework," Draft, 2004.
9 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-
Informed Decisions on Plant Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," Regulatory Guide 1.174. Washington,
DC, 1998
10 James, W., "Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking," New York: Longmans, Green,
1907
l See supra note 4
12 Apostolakis, G. E., "The Precautionary Principle and Defense in Depth," Presented at the Second ILK
SymposiumMunich, October 28, 2003.
13 From NRC website: Glossary, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/design-basis-accident.html
14 Sorensen, J.N., Apostolakis, G. E., Kress, T.S., and Powers, D.A., "On the Role of Defense in Depth in Risk-
Informed Regulation," Proceedings of PSA '99, International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety
Assessment, pp. 408-413, Washington, DC, August 22 - 26, 1999, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park,
Illinois
15 Report dated May 19, 1999, from Dana A. Powers, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards,
to Shirley Ann Jackson, Chairman, NRC, Subject: The Role of Defense in Depth in a Risk-Informed
Regulatory System
78
16 Beck, C., "Basic Goals of Regulatory Review: Major Considerations Affecting Reactor Licensing,"
Statement submitted to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, Hearings on
Licensing and Regulation of Nuclear Reactors, April 4,5,6,20, and May 3, 1967
7 From NRC website: Full-Text Glossary, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/full-text.html
18 "Nuclear Regulation: Strategy Needed to Regulate Safety Using Information on Risk", US General
Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, March 1999, GAO/RCED-99-95
19 USNRC, "Reactor Safety Study - An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power
Plants", WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), October 1975
20 "Report Of The Technical Assessment Task Force On Technical Staff Analysis Reports Summary", Leonard
Jaffe, Technical Assessment Task Force, Staff Reports to The President's Commission on The Accident at
Three Mile Island, October 1979, Washington, D. C
21 Report dated October 11, 2000, from Dana A. Powers, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards, to Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, NRC, Subject: Union Of Concerned Scientists Report, "Nuclear
Plant Risk Studies: Failing The Grade"
22; Memorandum dated February 24, 1999, from Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary, NRC, to William D. Travers,
Executive Director for Operations, NRC, Subject: Staff Requirements Memorandum - SECY-99-144 - White
Paper on Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulation
23 Poloski, J. P., et al., "Rates of Initiating Events at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: 1987 - 1995," NUREG/CR-
5750, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, February 1999.
24 From NRC website: Use of Risk in Nuclear Regulations, http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-
do/regulatory/rulemaking/risk-informed.html
25 USNRC, "Use of probabilistic risk assessment methods in nuclear activities: Final policy statement," 60 FR
42622, Federal Register, Vol. 60, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1995
26 USNRC, "An approach for using probabilistic risk assessment in risk-informed decisions on plant-specific
changes to the current licensing basis," Regulatory guide 1.174, June 1998
27 Travers, W.D, "Update Of The Risk-Informed Regulation Implementation Plan," SECY-03-0044,
Attachment 2, 2003
28 Travers, W.D, "Status Report On Risk-Informing The Technical Requirements Of 10 Cfr Part 50 (Option
3)", SECY-00-0086, attachment 1, Framework For Risk-Informing The Technical Requirements Of 10 Cfr 50
Draft, Revision 0
79
29 USNRC, "Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants; Policy Statement," Federal Register, Vol.
51, p. 30028, August 21, 1986.
30 Callan, L.J, "Elevation of the core damage frequency objective to a fundamental commission safety goal,"
Technical report, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 1997.
31 USNRC,, "Framework for Risk-Informed Changes to the Technical Requirements of 10 CFR 50", SECY-
00-0198, attachment 1, 2000
32 USNRC, "Policy Issues Related to Licensing Non-Light-Water Reactor Designs," SECY-03-0047, 2003
33 USNRC, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, "Frame work for Risk-Informing the Technical
Requirements of 10 CFR 50," SECY-00-0198, Attachment 1, Washington, DC, 2000
34 Speech by Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson, Chairman, USNRC, "Transitioning to Risk-Informed Regulation: The
Role of Research," speech S-98-26, October 1998.
35 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Regulatory Approaches to PSA - Report on the
Survey of National Practices," NEA/CNRA/R(1995)2, CNRA Paris, Special Issues, 1996.
36 A. D. Swain and H. E. Guttmann, "Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear
Power Plant Applications," Report NUREG/CR-1278, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
D.C., 1983.
37 From NRC website: Common-Cause Failure Database, available at:
http://nrcoe.inel.gov/results/index.cfm?fuseaction=CCFDB.showMenu
38 XU, M., "Model Combination by Decomposition and Aggregation," Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT, Ph.D
Thesis, 2004.
39 Interview of Apostolakis, G.E., by Michal, R., "Apostolakis: On PRA," Nuclear News, p27, March 2000
40 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "State Of Living Psa And Further
Development," NEA/CSNI/R(99)15, 1999
4Gillette, C. P., and Krier, J.E. "Risk, Courts and Agencies", University Of Pennsylvania Law Review, 138 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1027, April, 1990
42 Ashford, N. A., "Science and Values in the Regulatory Process", Stat. Science, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1988, p 377-
383
43 Walker, V. R.,"The Myth Of Science As A "Neutral Arbiter" For Triggering Precautions", Boston College
International And Comparative Law Review, 26 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 197, Spring, 2003
80
lli
44 Speech by Commissioner Nils J. Diaz, "Remarks Before the American Radiation Safety Conference and
Exposition," 46th Annual Meeting of the Health Physics Society, Cleveland, Ohio, June 11, 2001
4i Apostolakis, G.E., Koser, J.P., Sato, G., "Decision Analysis and Its Application to the Frequency of
Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Tests," Nuclear Technology, Volume 146, Number 2, May 2004, Pages
181-198
46 Apostolakis, G.E., Golay, M.W., Camp, A., Duran, F., Finnicum, D., Ritterbusch, S, "A New Risk-Informed
Design And Regulatory Process", 2001
4' Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, SAPHIRE, Available at: http://saphire.inel.gov
48 Delaney, M.J., "Risk-Informed Design Guidance for a Generation-IV Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor Emergency
Core Cooling System," MIT-GFR-013, 2004
4 9 Pagani, L., "On the Quantification of Safety Margins", Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT, Ph.D Thesis, 2004.
50 USNRC, "Loss Of Offsite Power", available at:
http://nrcoe.inel.gov/results/index.cfm?fuseaction=LOSP.showMenu
51 USNRC, "Severe Accident Risk Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants", NUREG-1150, Draft 2,
1989.
52 Dupuy P., Corenwinder F., Lanore J.M., Gryffroy D., De Gelder P. and Hulsmans M., "Comparison of the
level 1 PSA for two similar PWR types: the French 900 MWe-series PWR and the Belgian Tihange 1 PWR,"
Proceedings of the PSAM 5 Conference, Osaka (Japan) 1, 2000,559-564
53 C. Atwood et al, "Evaluation of Loss of Offsite Power Events at Nuclear Power Plants: 1980 - 1996,"
NUREG/CR-5496, Idaho Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, November 1998
54 Devictor, Nicolas, Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, personal communication, 2004
55 European Commission, "Methods of identification and quantification of the sources of uncertainties",
Reliability Methods for Passive Systems functions (RMPS) project, deliverable 1, 2002
56 European Commission, "Reliability Methods For Passive Systems", RMPS project, deliverable 12, 2004
57 Kopustinskas, V., "Approaches For Introducing Passive System Unreliability In Accidental Sequence", in
RMPS project, deliverable 7, 2003
58 Williams, W.C., Hezlar, P., Saha, P., "Analysis of a Convection Loop for GFR Post-LOCA Decay-Heat
Removal," Proc. of the 12'h International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, ICONE12-49360, ASME,
Arlington, VA, USA (2004)
81
59 USNRC, "An Approach For Determining The Technical Adequacy Of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results
For Risk-Informed Activities," Regulatory Guide 1.200 For Trial Use, February 2004
60 Seung-cheol Jang, Won-dea Jung, Kwang-sub Jeong, Jae-joo Ha and Young-ho Jin, "Implication of Default





A.1 GFR Design Parameter Summary
The main characteristics of the GFR are summarized in Table A-1.
Attribute Option
Power 2400 MWt
Coolant C02 (direct cycle)
or He (indirect cycle)
Power Cycle Supercritical C02, direct or indirect
Reactor Vessel Prestressed Cast Iron Vessel (PCIV)
or Prestressed Concrete Reactor Vessel (PCRV)
Shutdown Cooling System 3 x 50% capable loops
(combined Shutdown & emergency) forced + passive convection
water-boiler ultimate heat rejection
Containment PWR type sized to keep post-LOCA pressure -5atm
Table A-1: Main design characteristics of the GFR
A.2 PRA Model for LOOP Event Sequences
A.2.1 Event Trees
The event tree analysis for the LOOP is composed of four trees. The first tree (Figure
A-1) models the events during the first hour after the LOOP. Then, it is considered
whether offsite power has been recovered or not ("RECOV_1 event"):
· Recovery successful: the transfer is made to REC1-24H (Figure A-2)
· Recovery unsuccessful: the transfer is made to NREC1-24H (Figure A-3).
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If the recovery has been successful, a 24 hours mission time is considered to check that
normal cooling of decay heat can be performed. If normal cooling can be performed
during 24 hours, then it is assumed that the accident initiation is terminated.
If the recovery is not successful after 1 hour, then a 24 hours mission time is also
considered. If the core can be cooled during 24 hours, another recovery event is
introduced ("RECOV_24 event"):. Then:
· Recovery successful: the accident is considered as terminated
· Recovery unsuccessful: the transfer is made to NREC24-200H (Figure A-4).
NREC24-200H is the last subtree. The mission time is 200 hours. No further transfer is
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Figure A-2: REC1-24H LOOP event tree (24 hrs mission time)- subtree for the case
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Figure A-3: NRECI-24H LOOP event tree (24 hrs mission time)- subtree for the case
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Figure A-4: NREC24-200H LOOP event tree (200 hrs mission time)- subtree for the case






The reactor must be tripped immediately after the LOOP. The failure of the scram will
have to be specifically addressed in the Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)
ET. As it has not been studied yet, we conservatively assume that a failure to scram will
lead to core damage.
The scram system has not been designed yet, so that its failure probability must be
assessed from other PRA studies. 10-6 - 10-5 are common failure probability values for
failure of reactor trip on demand. However, fast reactors need to have especially reliable
scram systems. Therefore a better reference is the system licensed for the Clinch River
Breeder reactor (also a fast reactor). The scram system was composed of two
mechanically independent scram systems, and the unavailability of the systems was
supposed to be 7*10-5 for the primary and 8*10-5 for the secondary.xxi
Therefore, we conservatively took a reactor trip failure probability of 10-7 / demand and
an Error Factor (EF) of 30.' xx The trip will be designed to bring the core to 2% of its
maximum power level. Then a system is needed to remove the decay heat.
AC Power Generation
Offsite Power constitutes the preferred AC power source for operation of all the active
components, so that onsite AC power generation is needed after a LOOP to cool the core
through active convection. In existing power plants, emergency diesel generators are used
to generate emergency AC power. This is also our reference AC source. Thus, if nothing
else is specified, onsite AC power in the ET means diesel AC power. Two diesels are
used in the final design, but options from one to three diesels have been investigated.
Each diesel is supposed to be able to support 100% of the load (one diesel is needed and
sufficient for success).
The failure modes for the AC system are the following: failure to order the diesels
activation, failure to start the diesels, failure to run the diesels for a given time and failure
of power transmission. Associated fault trees are represented from Figure C-1 to Figure
C-4.
xxi Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant, Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, Appendix C, 1976(?)
xxii This is equivalent to assuming that the CCF beta factor for the failure of both trip systems would be
1.4* 10-3 . It is a very low value for a CCF parameter, but the system would be designed to be independent.
In the Clinch River safety analysis, there is actually no mention of CCF between both systems. In the GFR,
even with a CCF factor one order of magnitude higher, the failure sequence involving failure to trip would
be 10-6, which would far below the CDF limits.
DC Power Generation
DC power is needed for all plant instrumentation. Its failure therefore makes it impossible
to operate the active cooling system. Three batteries, each capable of meeting 100% of
the DC demand are used in our model. The failure of DC generation will therefore
essentially be CCFs. We used a CCF value found in the Lungmen PRA,Xx" ' and it appears
that DC power failure is not an important risk contributor (the failure of the diesels is
much more likely). One associated fault tree (FT) is shown on Figure C-5.
If both AC and DC power are available, then the failure of the active cooling system is
considered.
Active SCS:
This is the preferred cooling mode. All the licensed reactors in the US rely mainly on an
active cooling system after shutdown.
Three loops are used, and each in capable of removing 50% of the maximum decay heat
after the trip (2% of full power). The design of one loop is shown on Figure 4-5. In each
loop a blower forces the flow between the core and a heat exchanger.
In each SCS loop, the identified main points of possible failure are: flow blockage (CV
failure), failure to force the flow (blower, electric motor), failure of the heat exchange
(Heatric heat exchanger, Water Boiler Loop). The Water Boiler Loop (WBL) failures
modes are: insufficient water flow, and insufficient water available. Associated fault trees
are represented from Figure C-6 to Figure C-l1.
Passive SCS:
The SCS can be designed so that the core will be cooled by passive convection. But it
would be relied on only if the preferred active cooling mode fails.
In this case there are no active components that can make the system fail, but the flow
can still be blocked by the failure of a CV. It is all the more important to consider it that
under natural convection the forces to open the CV would be smaller (it will open only
under gravity, with very limited flow from standby blower). Therefore the CV failure
probability is higher in these conditions, and we differentiate between the failure under
full active flow ("CV failure") and the one under passive flow ("CV failure", see
Appendix B)
The failure of the heat exchanger is also common to the active and passive modes.
Finally, functional failures of the passive convection to start or to maintain steady-state
are also integrated in the fault tree analysis of the passive convection mode. The fault
trees are represented from Figure C-12 to Figure C-15. We present in Part 4.2.3 the
challenge in assessing such failures.
xiii PRA from the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report of the Lungmen plant (Taiwan), available at:
http://www.aec.gov.tw/npp4info/lm_document psarAa.pdf
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B. Basic Events for the PRA
B.1 Basic events description and failure data
The basic events used in the PRA model are described briefly in Table B-1. Then in
Table B-2 the failure probabilities used in the PRA model are given, and the most
important ones are discussed in Appendice B.2.
When there are multiple identical components, only one is reported here. Thus "SCS-1-
CV-OPEN" refers to the CV located in the loop 1 (similarly there are a "SCS-2-CV-
OPEN" and a "SCS-3-CV-OPEN" in the model). The mission time considered for each
event is mentioned ("RUN-DIESEL1-24" refers to the failure of diesel 1 to run during a












































Failure to recover after 1 h from AC order failure
Failure to recover after 24h from AC order failure
Failure to initiate onsite generation automatically
Automatic SCS activation failure
Battery 1 charger failure h
Battery 1 charger failure 200h
Battery 1 charger failure 24h
Failure to provide output on demand batt 1 h
Failure to provide output on demand batt 1 200
Failure to provide output c., demand batt 1 24h
Beta factor for blower failure to run
Beta factor for blower failure to start
Beta factor for blower standby failure
Beta factor for CP failure to open
Beta factor for CV failure to open
Beta factor for CV failure to stay open
Beta factor CCF diesel to run
Beta factor CCF diesel to start
Beta factor for el motor failure to run
Beta factor for el motor failure to start
Beta factor for Heat Exchanger failure
Beta CCF factor for passive water flow WBL
Beta factor for pump failure to run
Beta factor for pump failure to start
Blower 1 Failure Run 200h
Blower 1 Failure Run 24h
Blower 1 Start Failure
Standby Blower 1 failure
CCF Battery 1 H
CCF Battery 200H
CCF Battery 24H
CCF Blower run 200
CCF Blower run 24h
CCF Blower start
CCF CP open
CCF CP stay open 200
CCF CP stay open 24h





CCF-CV-OP CCF CV open
CCF-CVSTO-200 CCF CV stay open 200
CCF-CVSTO-24 CCF CV stay open 24h
CCF-DIES-200 CCF diesel run 200h
CCF-DIES-24 CCF diesel run 24h
CCF-DIES-ST CCF diesel start
CCF-ELM-R-200 CCF elect motor run 200h
CCF-ELM-R-24 CCF elect motor run 24h
CCF-ELM-ST CCF elect motor start
CCF-HX-1 CCF HCHX 1H
CCF-HX-200 CCF HCHX 200
CCF-HX-24 CCF HCHX 24H
CCF-PASS-ST CCF passive start
CCF-PASS-W-1 H CCF passive water loo 1 h
CCF-PASS-W-200 CCF passive water loop 200h
CCF-PASS-W-24H CCF passive water loop 24h
CCF-PUMP-1H CCF pump 1h
CCF-PUMP-200H CCF pump 200h
CCF-PUMP-24H CCF pump 24h
CCF-STBY-BLOWER CCF standby blower
CCF-TRANSM-DC-1 H CCF in DC transmission 1 H
CCF-TRANSM-DC-200H CCF in DC transmission 200H
CCF-TRANSM-DC-24H CCF in DC transmission 24H
DIES-1-UNAV Diesel 1 is unavailable
DIES-2-UNAV Diesel 2 is unavailable
DIES-3-UNAV Diesel 3 is unavailable
HCHX-1 -1 H Heatric Heat Exchanger 1 Failure 1 h
HCHX-1-200H Heatric Heat Exchanger 1 Failure 200h
HCHX-1-24H Heatric Heat Exchanger 1 Failure 24h
IND-FAIL-DIES1-200 Failure probability of diesel 1 during 200h without repair
IND-FAIL-DIES1-24H Failure probability of diesel 1 during 24h without repair
INDICATION Indication Failure
INVERTOR-1-1H Failure of AC DC invertor 1 lh
INVERTOR-1-200H Failure of AC DC invertor 1 200h
INVERTOR-1-24H Failure of AC DC invertor 1 24h
LOOP-1-UNAV Loop 1 is unavailable
LOOP-2-UNAV Loop 2 is unavailable
LOOP-3-UNAV Loop 3 is unavailable
LOOP-4-UNAV Loop 4 is unavailable
Failure of hardware used for manual activation of AC
MAN-AC-ACT-HARDWARE generation
MANUAL-ACT-HARDWARE Failure of hardware used for manual activation of SCS
Table B-1 (continued): Description of the basic events used in the PRA
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MOTOR-SCS-1 -RUN-200H Electric Motor SCS 1 run 200h Failure
MOTOR-SCS-1-RUN-24H Electric Motor SCS 1 run 24h Failure
MOTOR-SCS-1-START Electric Motor SCS 1 Start Failure
NO PASSIVE DESIGN (used to see risk with no passive
NO-PASSIVE-DESIGN mode)
NO-REC1-FROM-D-CCF-24H No recovery from Diesels CCF 24H
NREC1 -24H Introduce Subtree after recovery failure after 1 hour - 24 hrs
mission time tree
NREC24-200H Introduce Subtree after recovery failure after 24hours -
200hrs mission time tree
OPERATOR-AC-ACT-FAIL Operator failure to activate AC
OPERATOR-SCS-ACT-FAIL Operator failure to activate SCS
PASSIVE-START Failure of passive convection to start in SCS
PASSIVE-STEADY-200H Failure of passive steady state 200h
PASSIVE-STEADY-24H Failure of passive steady state 24h
PASS-W-FLOW-1-1H Failure of passive water flow in WBL 1 during 1 hour
PASS-W-FLOW-1-200 Failure of passive water flow in WBL 1 during 200 hours
PASS-W-FLOW-1-24H Failure of passive water flow in WBL 1 during 24 hours
PUMP-1-FAILURE-1H Pump 1 failure lh
PUMP-1-FAILURE-200H Pump 1 failure 200
PUMP-1-FAILURE-24H Pump 1 failure 24h
RECl -24H Introduce Subtree after recovery success after 1 hour - 24
hrs mission time tree
RECOVW 1 LOOP recovery after 1 hour
RECOVW 24 LOOP recovery after 24 hours
RUN-DIESELl-200 Failure to run diesel 1 200h
RUN-DIESEL1-24 Failure to run diesel 1 24h
RX-TRIP Reactor Trip
SCS-1-CP-OPEN SCS 1 CP Failure to Open
SCS-1-CP-STAY-OP-200 SCS 1 CP Failure to stay Open 200h
SCS-1 -CP-STAY-OP-24H SCS 1 CP Failure to Open Open 24h
SCS-1-CV-OPEN SCS 1 CV Failure to Open
SCS-1 -CV-STAY-OP-200 SCS 1 CV Failure to stay Open 200h
SCS-1-CV-STAY-OP-24H SCS 1 CV Failure to Open Open 24h
ST-AND-LOAD-DIES-1 Failure to start and load diesel 1
ST-FAIL-RECOV-D1 -1 H Failure to recover from diesell failure to start after 1 H
ST-FAIL-RECOV-D1 -24H Failure to recover from diesell failure to start after 24H
TRANSMISSION-1 Failure of elect onsite power transmission 1 h
TRANSMISSION-200 Failure of elect onsite power transmission 200h
TRANSMISSION-24 Failure of elect onsite power transmission 24
WATER-AVAIL-1 H Water unavailable 1 h
WATER-AVAIL-200 Water unavailable 200h
WATER-AVAIL-24 Water unavailable 24h
Table B-1 (continued 2): Description of the basic events used in the PRA
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The failure probabilities are given in Table B-2. The following information is given for
each event:
* Calculation type (Fdt). It can take the values 1, 3 or 5 depending on the model
used to calculate the failure probability:
- 1: a simple failure probability is used as input,
- 3: Failure probability of an operating component without repair. The
model uses the following formula: P=l-exp(-lambda*mission time),
- 5: Failure probability of an operating component with the possibility of
repair following a failure.
- c: Compound event. Used for CCFs.
* Uncertainty distribution used to model the epistemic uncertainty (Udt). "L" refers
to the use of a lognormal distribution, and "N" to the exponential distribution.
* Uncertainty parameters used (Ud Value). It indicates the value of the error factor
(for the epistemic uncertainties modeled by lognormal distribution) or of the
standard deviation (for the epistemic uncertainties modeled by the exponential
distribution).
* Single failure probability (Prob) used for type 1 calculation type
* Hourly failure rate (Lambda) used for type 3 and 5 calculation types
* Repair time for type 5 calculation type (in hours)
* Mission time for type 3 and 5 calculation types (in hours)
* The source of the data:
- AP1000: From the AP1000 PRA.xxiv
- Lungmen: From the PRA for the Lungmen plant (Boiling Water Reactor,
Taiwan)xv
- S: the failure probability has been subjectively assessed.
- D: historical data have been used to get the probability value.
"i~ Westinghouse Electric Company, "AP-1000 Probability Risk Assessment, Revision 1," Pittsburgh, PA,
2003
xv See footnote XXiii for reference
95
Rep Miss.FdT UdT Ud Prob Source
Name of the Basic Event Value Lambda time time
AC-ORDER-RECOV-IH 1 L 10 5.OE-01 -- -- S
AC-ORDER-RECOV-24H 1 L 10 1.OE-02 -- -- S
AUTOMATIC-AC I L 10 1.OE-04 - -- - Lungmen
AUTOMATIC-SCS 1 L 10 1.0OE-04 - -- - Lungmen
BATTERY-I-CHARGER-IH 5 L 3 -- 7.OE-06 10 1 AP1000
BATTERY-1 -CHARGER-BATTERY-I-CHARGER- 5 L 3 -- 7.OE-06 10 200 AP1000
200H
BATTERY-I -CHARGER-24H 5 L 3 -- 7.OE-06 10 24 AP1000
BATTERY-1-POWER-SYST- 5 L 3 2.OE-06 10 1 AP1OO
1H
BATTERY- 1-POWER-SYST- 5 L 3 -- 2.0E-06 10 200 AP1000200
BATTERY-1-POWER-SYST- 5 L 3 -- 2.OE-06 10 24 AP1000
24H
BETA-BLOWER-RUN 1 L 10 5.OE-02 - -- - AP1000
BETA-BLOWER-START 1 L 10 1.OE-01 -- -- -- AP 1000
BETA-BLOWER-STBY 1 10 1.OE-01 -- -- -- AP 1000
BETA-CP-OP 1 L 10 1.OE-01 -- -- -- AP 1000
BETA-CV-OP 1 L 3 2.7E-02 -- -- -- AP1000
BETA-CV-STAY-OP 1 L 10 5.OE-02 -- -- -- AP1000
BETA-DIES-RUN I L 3 7.3E-02 -- -- -- AP1000
BETA-DIES-START I L 3 2.0E-02 -- -- -- AP1000
BETA-EL-MOTOR-RUN 1 L 10 5.OE-02 -- -- AP1000
BETA-EL-MOTOR-START 1 L 10 1.OE-01 -- -- -- AP 1000
BETA-HEAT-EXCH 1 L 10 5.OE-02 -- -- -- AP1000
BETA-PASS-W-FLOW I L 10 1.OE-01 -- -- -- S
BETA-PUMP-RUN 1 L 3 6.0E-02 -- -- -- AP1000
BETA-PUMP-START 1 L 3 1.4E-01 -- -- -- AP 1000
BLOWER-1 -RUN-1H 3 L 10 -- 2.OE-05 -- 1
BLOWER-1-RUN-200H 3 L 10 -- 2.0E-05 -- 200 AP1000 + S
BLOWER-I-RUN-24H 3 L 10 -- 2.OE-05 -- 24 (see App B)
BLOWER-i-START I L 10 1.OE-03 -- -- --
BLOWER-I -STBY-IND-FAIL 1 L 10 1.OE-03 -- -- -- S
DIES-1-UNAV 1 L 10 4.6E-02 -- -- -- AP1000
DIES-2-UNAV 1 L 10 4.6E-02 -- -- -- AP1000
DIES-3-UNAV 1 L 10 4.6E-02 -- -- -- AP1000
HCHX-1-IH 3 L 10 -- 1.OE-06 -- 1 AP1000
HCHX-1-200H 3 L 10 -- 1.OE-06 -- 200 AP 1000I
HCHX-I-24H 3 L 10 -- 1.OE-06 -- 24 AP1000
rND-FAIL-DIES 1-200 3 L 3 -- 2.4E-03 -- 200 AP1000
IND-FAIL-DIES 1I-24H 3 L 3 -- 2.4E-03 -- 24 AP1000
INDICATION 1 L 3 1.OE-06 -- -- -- AP1000
INVERTOR- 1 - IH 5 L 3 -- 2.OE-05 10 1 AP1000
INVERTOR-1-200H 5 L 3 -- 2.OE-05 10 200 AP1000
INVERTOR- 1I-24H 5 L 3 -- 2.OE-05 10 24 APIOOO 1000
Table B-2: Failure data and sources
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LOOP-1-UNAV 1 L 10 1.0E-05 -- -- S
MAN-AC-ACT-HARDWARE 1 L 10 1.OE-04 -- -- S
MANUAL-ACT-HARDWARE 1 L 10 1.0OE-04 -- -- - S
MOTOR-SCS-1-RUN-I H 3 L 3 -- 1.OE-05 -- 1 AP1000
MOTOR-SCS-I-RUN-200H 3 L 3 -- 1.OE-05 -- 200 AP1000
MOTOR-SCS-1-RUN-24H 3 L 3 -- 1.OE-05 -- 24 AP1000
MOTOR-SCS-I-START 1 L 3 3.OE-04 - -- AP 1000
NO-REC 1-FROM-D-CCF-24H 1 L 10 1.OE-01 -- -- S
OPERATOR-AC-ACT-FAIL 1 L 10 2.6E-03 -- -- -- AP1000
OPERATOR-SCS-ACT-FAIL 1 L 10 1.0OE-03 -- -- -- AP 1000
PASS-W-FLOW-1-IH 1 L 15 1.OE-06 -- -- -- S
PASS-W-FLOW-1-200 1 L 15 1.OE-06 -- -- -- S
PASS-W-FLOW-1-24H 1 L 15 1.OE-06 -- -- -- S
PASSIVE-START 1 L 30 1.OE-02 -- -- --
PASSIVE-STEADY-200H 1 L 30 1.OE-07 -- -- -- S (see Part 4.2.3)
PASSIVE-STEADY-24H 1 L 30 1.OE-08 -- -- --
4.E-RECOVW _ 1 N 8.OE-01 -- -- -- DRECOVW 1 02
7.E-RECOVW 24 1 N 7.E- 1.6E-02 -- -- -- D
RECOVW 24 03
RUN-DIESEL I-200 5 L 10 2.4E-03 8 200 API000
RUN-DIESEL 1I-24 5 L 3 2.4E-03 8 24 AP 1000
RX-TRIP 1 L 10 1.OE-07 -- -- -- See App B
SCS-1-CP-OPEN 1 L 10 1.OE-03 -- -- 
SCS-1-CP-STAY-C)P-200 3 L 30 - 4.E-07 200 1000 + S (see
App B)
SCS-I -CP-STAY-C)P-24H 3 L 30 -- 4.0E-07 -- 24 
SCS-1-CV-OPEN 1 L 3 1.OE-04 -- -- -- AP 1000
SCS-I -CV-STAY-OP-200 3 L 30 2.E-07 -- 200 AP1000
SCS-1-CV-STAY-OP-24H 3 L 30 2.OE-07 -- 24 AP1000
ST-AND-LOAD-DIES-I 1 L 3 5.OE-02 -- -- -- AP1000
ST-FAIL-RECOV-DI-IH 1 L 10 5.OE-01 -- -- S
ST-FAIL-RECOV-D I -24H 1 L 10 5.OE-02 -- -- -- S
TRANSMISSION-I 1 L 10 1.OE-05 -- -- -- Lungmen
TRANSMISSION-200 1 L 10 5.E-06 -- -- -- AP 1000
TRANSMISSION-24 1 L 10 5.OE-07 -- -- -- AP1000
WATER-AVAIL-IH 1 L 10 1.OE-08 -- -- -- S
WATER-AVAIL-200 1 L 10 1.OE-06 -- -- -- S
WATER-AVAIL-24 I L 10 1 .OE-07 -- -- -- S
Table B-2 (continued): Failure data and sources
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Common Cause Failure events
CCF-BATT-IH 1 L 10 .0OE-05 Lungmen
CCF-BATT-200H 1 L 10 1.OE-03 -- Lungmen









CCF-CVSTO-24 c 2.4E-07 These events are saphire
CCF-DIES-200 c 2.8E-02 "compound events" (compound
CCF-DIES-24 c 4.1 E-03 of CCF factors and independent
CCF-DIES-ST c l.OE-03 failure probabilities). The
CCF-ELM-R-200 c .OE-04 uncertainty is calculated bySaphire from the uncertainties
______CCF-ELM-R-24 c 1_.2E-05 on the CCF factors and on the
CCF-ELM-ST c 3.OE-05 independent failure probabilities.
CCF-HX-1 c 5.0E-08 The values presented here are









CCF-TRANSM-DC-IH L 0 OE-05 Lungmen
CCF-TRANSM-DC-200H I L 10 5.OE-06 AP 1000
1 L 10 5.0E-07 -- AP1000CCF-TRANSM-DC-24H AP1000
1 L 30 1.0E-02
PASSIVE-START -
PASSIVE-STEADY- 1 L 30 1.0E-07 S-- -  (see Part 4.2.3)
200H--
PASSIVE-STEADY-24H L 30 1OE-08
Table B-2 (continued 2): Failure data and sources (CCFs)
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B.2 Discussion of data used
Check-valve:
During normal plant operation, each loop is closed by a passive check-valve (CV). The
CV is kept in the closed position by the same pressure difference as that existing between
the inlet and the outlet of the core. Once the reactor is tripped, this pressure drop is lost so
that the CV opens under a combination of gravitational force and of the pressure created
by the flow due to the blower. The coolant can then flow to cool the core.
Various sources give the failure of a CV to open, but none relies on data specific to gas
reactors. 'vi The generic failure probability for opening (found for example in Wash-1400
or AP-1000) is 104.xxvii It seems adapted to take the generic value for the active flow
conditions, but it may be too optimistic for the passive flow case. Therefore, in order to
allow for more accuracy and flexibility in the PRA, we distinguish between the failure of
the CV to open under active flow, and its failure under passive flow only, that we will
note CP failure.
Some PRAs also consider a "failure of the CV to stay open". It is included here and we
take the AP-1000 values.
The CV will have to be especially designed for the GFR. Therefore, although we think
that generic values are justified at this stage of the design, there are still high uncertainties
on the reliability that will finally be obtained. The sensitivity analysis in Part 4.4.2 aims
at giving reliability goals.
xxvi P. De Laquil faced the same problem in his complete PRA of the GA GCFR in 1976. He based his
estimation of the valve reliability on Wash-1400 generic values for the failure to open and for the CCF
factors. De Laquil, P., "An accident probability analysis and design evaluation of the gas-cooled fast
breeder reactor demonstration plant", Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT, Ph.D. Thesis, 1976.
xxvii Westinghouse Electric Company, "AP-1000 Probability Risk Assessment, Revision 1," Pittsburgh, PA,
2003
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In order to improve CV reliability, designers will also minimize CCFs by using different
designs and / or by using multiple parallel CVs in each loop. If requested, a fail-safe
actuator could also be added, as considered in the 1980 GCFR GA design. " " "
Check-valve under passive flow (CP):
The failure of the CV under passive flow (only limited flow from the blower due to its
standby momentum) is designated under "CP failure". Failures to open or stay open are
considered. The failure probabilities are derived from the generic values taken for CV
failures. They are slightly (and subjectively increased) to account for the smaller force
opening the check-valve (and keeping it open) under passive flow conditions.
Heatric Heat Exchanger (HCHX):
Heat exchangers are widely used in the industry. Therefore their failure modes are well
understood, and hourly failure rates can be found easily (AP-1000, Lungmen PRA).
Leakage is the main failure mode. On the one hand the HCHX will be of a new design,
but on the other hand the Heatric company claims that they have never experienced any
leak.
Balancing their higher safety record with their smaller experience, we think that the
generic values are appropriate. We keep the quite high EF found in generic tables
(EF= 10).
Water Flow in the WBL: see end of Part 4.2.3.
Water available for WBL:
In order to function adequately, the WBL needs to get sufficient amount of water. This
means that enough water must be supplied to it. The water tank where water will be
stored will be big enough for a few days of cooling, and it will be checked, together with
the pipes, for possible leakage. Moreover, the pipes of the WBL will be made of double
piping that has a negligible risk of leakage under normal conditions. The risk of water
unavailability will therefore be very low, although higher for very long mission time (i.e.
XXViii General Atomics, "Gas-Cooled Fast Breeder Reactor Preliminary Safety Information Document -
Amendment 10", GA-10298, 1980.
()()
I__
200 hrs). For the CCF events, we take a water availability failure (in 2 loops) of 10-8 for 1
hour (EF=10), 10-7 for 24 hours (EF=10), and 10-6 for 200 hours (EF=30).
Blowers:
A blower will have to be designed to move the fluid in the SCS. Such blowers are not
used in current operating US nuclear power plants, but all HTGRs had some.""Xi
However, we could not access operating reliability information.
In order to evaluate the reliability of the blower, we first use the data found on blowers
(in AP-1000 and in the Lungmen nuclear power plant PRA). However, as blowers are
used for ventilation in these plants, they are not as challenged as the blower in the GFR
SCS (see Table B-3). In these designs, pumps are used to move the coolant. Thus, pump
reliability gives additional information on what could be the blower's reliability. We
therefore combine subjectively the information given by blower and pump failure rates,
and we take a high EF to acknowledge the uncertainties.
XXiX Personal conversation with MIT designer Prof. Driscoll
!(t)
Error
Source Component Failure type Probability Factor Comment
start 6.OE-04 3
CCF beta factor 1.OE-01 Lungmen PRA has the
same values for failure to
start and to run (but noAP-1000 Blower run (/hr) 1.OE-05 3 CCF information was
CCF beta factor 5.OE-02 found). The CCF are
CCF double (per generic
hr) 5.OE-07
start 2.OE-03 10
CCF beta factor 1.4E-01 Lungmen PRA has the
CCF double 2.8E-04 same values for failure to
AP-1000 Pump run (/hr) 2.5E-05 10 start and to run (but no
CCF beta factor 6.2E-02 CCF information was
CCF double (per found)
hr) 1.6E-06
Table B-3: Data used to assess the reliability of the blower
Electric Motors:
An electric motor is needed to power each blower. Electric motors are used widely in
nuclear power plants, and the ones used in the GFR will probably be common to other
designs. We therefore used directly the generic values found in the AP-1000 database.
The CCF factors used are the generic parameters recommended in the AP-1000 report.
Diesel generators:
Generic values have been used for the diesels. According to WASH-1400, ' the failure
probability of diesels following a LOOP may be higher than the generic one. Indeed, both
diesel generators will have to pick up the emergency load and this single event could trip
both units at a greater failure rate. Therefore we increase the diesel single failure
probability from 1.4*10-2 to 5*102, the EF from 3 to 10, and we keep the same CCF
factors. The failure probability to run is kept the same. During a given mission time, we
consider that independent failures of diesels can be repaired, and we adopt a four hours
xxx WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), "Reactor Safety Study, An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 1975.
I (2
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mean repair time in NUREG-1032.xxxi However, a simultaneous failure of both diesels
would cause the active systems to fail immediately, independently of any repair
possibility.
The event referred as transmission failures have been assessed using failure rate on
circuit breakers. In the Lungmen power plant PRA, a failure probability of 3* 10-4 is taken
for the failure to close of the circuit breakers associated to one diesel. In the INEL-NRC
CCF database, a beta factor of 3*10-2 was found. Thus a failure probability of 10-5 is
taken for the failure of the transmission during the starting process of the diesels. During
operation, a failure of 5*10-7 was found in AP-1000. Therefore a failure probability of
5*10-7 and 5*10-6 is taken for the CCF during respectively 24 and 200 hours.
Batteries:
Batteries are needed to provide DC power for instrumentation and active components
control. Three batteries will be used, each capable of providing 100% of the emergency
needs. In the current design it is not considered that AC power can be provided through a
DC-AC invertor. Therefore, if diesels fail, then the active system fails and it does not
matter for the SCS whether DC power is available or not.
The main contributors for DC power failure are battery CCF events. There probability
has been found in Lungmen PRA. It is found that batteries will not be important risk
contributors with this design. Concerning electrical transmission failures, the same values
than for diesels are used.
Pump:
A pump will be used in each WBL to bring additional safety to the passive system (see
Part 4.4.1). Generic data from AP-1000 PRA (same than from Lungmen PRA) are taken.
It is important to specify that the pumps that will be used will not have an active seal, and
therefore will not be subjected to pump seal LOCAs. In case of station blackout, it will be
possible to power them with a special independent back-up battery.
Xxxi U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1988. Evaluation Of Station Blackout Accidents At Nuclear
Power Plants, NUREG-1032. Washington, D.C.
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B.3 Importance measures
Importance measures are given in Table B-4 (ranked by Fussell-Vesely importance) and















































































































































Table B-4: Importance Measures Report - ranked by Fussell-Vesely importance value




































































































































































































'Table B-5: Importance Measures Report - ranked by RIR value






























































































































The importance measure tables were used to select the basic events to include in the
sensitivity analysis of Part 4.4.2. The events with a RIR higher than 100 and a FV
importance higher than 5% were automatically included. Then, the events with a RIR
greater than 20 and the one with a FV importance 0.1% were generally included, except
the following:
- Diesels, battery and transmission failure: these events are well
understood (due to the extensive experience in nuclear power plants),
and also they do not not have a very high FV importance,
- Blowers, electric motors: it is also believed that these failures are well
understood,
- Loop unavailability events (maintenance in one SCS loop): they have a
low FV importance and it is quite easy to control that their risk
contribution will not increase,
- Single failures: when CCF were considered for one event, the single
failure were not integrated in the sensitivity analysis,
- LOOP recovery after 1 hour: it has a very low RIR (1.039), because we
consider a 24 hrs minimum mission time, even if power is recovered
after one hour. Therefore an increase in this probability affects the risk
very little.
The sequences with the failure of passive convection to start (in the SCS loops or in the




C.1 Onsite AC and DC Power Generation
The failure modes for the AC system are: failure to order the diesels activation, failure to
start the diesels, failure to run the diesels for a given time and failure of power




































Figure C-2: Start Onsite Power (2)


































































































C.2 SCS Active mode
The high level failure modes are: failure to order SCS activation, and failure the SCS
itself.
Figure C-6: SCS Active Mode, 1 hour mission time (1)
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Failure modes of the heat exchange function: failure of the HCX, failure of
















































































C.3 SCS Passive Mode




Figure C-12: SCS Passive Mode, 1 hour mission time (1)
(No passive design is an event used for modeling purpose only; to model designs with no
passive convection)
' 11X
The failure of the flow can be caused by a flow blockage (CV), or by the failure of the



























































































D. Risk-Driven design: case without passive
convection
This Appendice present the risk-driven process for the case where the plant is not
designed to be cooled under passive convection. This case gave a basis for the designer to
compare the safety advantages of the passive cooling with its additional design
requirements.
In this case the bare-bones plant is constituted of two SCS loops (each capable of
removing 50% of the heat) and one diesel (case 1). The failure probability of the system
is high at this stage. Then diesels and SCS loops are progressively added. However, even
with 3 diesels (case 4), the design does not pass under the limit of 10% of the CDF limit.
Table D-l: PRA guided design, with no passive cooling, case 1 to 4.
At this stage (case 5), the CCF of the diesels dominate the risk. We use the Multi-Greek
Letters (MGL) model to quantify the CCF. With this model, adding a fourth diesel would
increase very little the reliability of the AC source (improvement by 10% with a classical
0.1 delta factor). Thus, such a design relying only on active convection with diesels as the




number Description Probability Limiting components Next step
Mean 95th %
1 2*50%, one diesel 1.1 E-03 2.4E-03 diesels availability add a diesel
Diesels availability,
2 2*50%, 2 diesels 1.1 E-04 2.3E-04 active SCS add a loop
components
3 3*50%, 2 diesels 6.6E-05 1.6E-04 diesels availability add a diesel
4 3*50%, 3 diesels 1.6E-05 4.5E-05 Diesels CCF ???
Three solutions are possible for the design team:
* Argue that their diesels will be more reliable (generic reliability values have been
used), because their design will be improved and the CCF limited. But the case
will be especially difficult to defend, as the generic values used are supported by
extensive historical data, and this CCF modeling has also been generally used.
Therefore, limited tests for the GFR project are not likely to modify the trust that
the NRC put into the diesels,
* Take another AC source. Micro-turbines and fuel cells engines have been
proposed. The concern here is that, once again, the limited data available will
make it hard to support reliability levels better than for the diesels,
* Add another AC source (like micro-turbines or fuel cells) to the diesels. Adding a
redundancy with a completely different system, not likely to share the same CCF,
is likely to decrease the failure probability of the AC power function of a few
orders of magnitude. It seems reasonable to argue that this system can easily reach
a 10-3 reliability, putting the core damage sequences involving loss of AC below
10-6 probability. Thus the AC system will not dominate the risk until such a level
is reached.
To evaluate the benefits of investing research in a very reliable AC system, the risk with
a perfect AC is calculated:
add other AC
4 3*50%, 3 diesels 1.6E-05 4.5E-05 Diesels CCF sources =>
"perfect AC"
SCS active
5 3*50%, perfect AC 4.9E-06 1.1 E-05 components start, DC ??
_ _..D power failure
Table D-2: PRA guided design, with no passive cooling, case 4 to 5.
The 10% of the mean CDF threshold is now satisfies, but not the 10% of the 9 5 th
percentile threshold. Failure of various active SCS components keeps the risk high.
The failure of the SCS active components to start (blower and electric motor) can also be
made negligible if they are kept on standby. Then the failure of the DC power dominates.
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As the design of this system was not investigated by the design team, we cannot propose
innovative solutions to improve it here (3 batteries are already used, adding another one
would not change the risk). To investigate further what safety level could be obtained
with a better DC system, we suppose it could be made almost "perfect".
SCS active standby SCS
5 3*50%, perfect AC 4.9E-06 1.1 E-05 components start, DC active
power failure system
3*50%, perfect AC,
6 standby active 3.9E-06 8.9E-06 DC power failure Perfect DC
systems
3*50%, perfect AC,
perfect DC, 7-7various active7 7.2E-07 2.OE-06 add a loopstandby active components CCF
systems
4*50%, perfect AC,
8 perfect DC, 3.3E-07 9.2E-07
standby active
,_ _ systems
Table D-3: PRA guided design, with no passive cooling, case 5 to 8.
The failure of active components to run long mission time (especially 24 hours) now
dominates the risk. The risk-driven design process was stopped here because there was no
apparent solution to decrease the risk more, and the safety level achieved was good.
The conclusion from this simulation is that licensing without passive cooling will be
difficult, but possible. The key will be in finding AC power sources that are reliable
enough. A very reliable DC system would also have to be investigated.
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